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Deconstruction’s widely accepted death has been closely associated with the death of its primary 
methodology: the practice of close reading, which has fallen into disfavor over the past three decades due 
to its association with formalism. The New Historical and political modes offer themselves as having 
inherited the important, iconoclastic features of deconstruction and at the same time offering a correction 
to its perceived faults. Three major figures in this turn, Stephen Greenblatt, Judith Butler, and Gayatri 
Spivak, describe their work in accordance with this narrative of inheritance and correction. In this essay, I 
reconsider deconstruction’s relationship to formalism and political literary criticism and argue that 
deconstruction plays an indispensable role in our current discussions of the history of formalism and the 
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To those who through love, friendship, and example have directed me toward a more profound sense of 
self that can only be discovered in life when you make the conscious decision to live it on your own 
terms. Your light continues to be a reminder to stay close to my own inspiration rather than emulate 
others and seek their affirmation. As I embark on new adventures, I carry our shared experiences and 













The recluse will doubt whether a philosopher CAN have "ultimate and actual" opinions at all; whether 
behind every cave in him there is not, and must necessarily be, a still deeper cave: an ampler, stranger, 
richer world beyond the surface, an abyss behind every bottom, beneath every "foundation." Every 
philosophy is a foreground philosophy—this is a recluse's verdict: "There is something arbitrary in the 
fact that the PHILOSOPHER came to a stand here, took a retrospect, and looked around; that he HERE 
laid his spade aside and did not dig any deeper—there is also something suspicious in it." Every 
philosophy also CONCEALS a philosophy; every opinion is also a LURKING-PLACE, every word is also 
a MASK. 
 
–Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 
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PREFACE AS EULOGY  
As Hegel reminds us in the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, every preface is occasioned 
by a death. A particular absence that we as readers or as writers are unable to apprehend or resolve but to 
which we are nonetheless indebted and must, in this moment, pay our last respects. For Hegel, the preface 
is always written after the main body of the text has run its course, and it is responsible for interpreting 
that work for the reader. The preface stands in for the absent text, the text we have not yet read, and tells 
us what it has to say. Hegel argues our attempts to reconcile this absence compel us along two divergent 
but equally inept pathways: we either preface a work by offering a definitional statement on what the 
work itself is or by identifying absences in other works and stating how this particular work addresses 
those absences. Hegel sees the failure of both impulses in their uninspired superficiality. He argues that if 
the preface were simply to announce the conclusions of a study prior to the main body of the text itself it 
would merely be presenting dead conclusions, or as he writes a “corpse which has left its guiding 
tendency behind it” (Miller 3). The other route, which begins with describing how the work by this author 
is different from the works of other authors, or as he writes,  “with differentiating and passing judgement 
on various thinkers,” would lack immersion (Miller 3). Hegel sees this endless, generalizing activity of 
classifying works by authors, types, and isms as distinct from other authors, types, and isms as both 
superficial and novelty seeking. He writes, “this kind of knowing is forever grasping at something new; it 
remains essentially preoccupied with itself instead of being preoccupied with the real issue and 
surrendering to it” (Miller 3). Hegel, with the observation of these failures, not only points out the errors 
of these approaches to preface writing that could be corrected with another approach but rather points out 
the more radical error, the foundational insufficiency that is the condition of possibility of the preface 
itself. The preface can only superficially stand in and attempt to speak for the text, but it can never roll up 
its sleeves and get down to doing the actual living breathing, immanent work of knowledge production of 
the text itself. The essential feature that necessitates the preface, makes it possible, also renders it 
impossible. When we eulogize, attempt to give a just interpretation of the absent other, we always find 
ourselves at a loss for words. 
2 
 In literary studies, deconstruction has many times been declared dead, and its commemorative 
place is often heralded for its role in displacing the hegemonic position of New Criticism in the 1960s and 
70s. The dead space this dead mode of analysis temporarily occupied during its bracketed, but 
nonetheless fruitful, life was a period of time between the erosion of the old system, New Criticism, and 
the birth of the new systems, New Historicism and political literary analysis. The New Historical and 
political modes offer themselves as having inherited the important, iconoclastic features of deconstruction 
and at the same time offered a correction to its faults. Three major figures in this turn, Stephen Greenblatt, 
Judith Butler, and Gayatri Spivak, offer their work in accordance to this narrative of inheritance and 
correction. Spivak best summarizes this general view guiding the political turn when she explains in “Can 
the Subaltern Speak?” that Derrida’s work falls short by making “Nietzschean philosophical and 
psychoanalytic, rather than specifically political, choices to suggest a critique of European ethnocentrism” 
(89). According to these thinkers, this failure to go beyond philosophy and psychoanalysis can be 
corrected. When deconstruction is used selectively as a tool, it can function in the service of a political 
analysis that challenges dominant modes of oppression. Greenblatt, following Foucault, demonstrates the 
ways that modes of power emerge from the margins and become dominant modes of production that 
shape our subjective lives, Spivak uses deconstruction in the service of a post-colonial Marxist analysis 
that involves targeted interventions within the enclosure of Eurocentric discourse, and Butler explores 
performance as a mode of deconstruction of hegemonic modes of power that govern the gender and 
sexual norms that shape our subjectivity. 
Despite this suggested resolution we see in this narrative presiding over and authorizing the 
transition from old to new, this preface, both predicate and antecedent, that lays to rest the old system and 
guarantees a passage to the new systems, I argue there remains an unresolved, haunting tension. In the 
construction of their new systems of analysis, political theorists don’t simply move beyond the formalism 
of the New Critics and resolve tensions around Derrida’s deconstruction of that formalism but rather 
construct a new formalism. They construct new systems that reenact traditional references to centers and 
unity. In doing so, Greenblatt, Spivak, and Butler overlook deconstruction’s main task: to recognize and 
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deconstruct all systems, to reveal that our focus on unity, completeness, and totality are a set of culturally 
fetishized values to which we attach the value tag truth. Derrida calls this classical systematic approach to 
knowledge metaphysics, and his deconstructive interventions in Western metaphysics from Plato to 21st 
century philosophers, theorists, and authors attempt to open this mode of thinking up to its own 
foundational lack of presence, the ontological absence that both precedes the system or text and operates 
within, frustrating its attempts at enclosure.  
Derrida uses the term phallogocentrism to describe this focus on unity, center, and completeness. 
Phallo-centrism has to do with our cultural focus on truth as a male centered mode of reproduction: the 
father producing the son, with the mother perceived as a transparent vehicle for this process. The son 
follows the footsteps of the father, the student follows the master, in order to arrive at truth, much as 
Hegel describes the preface as rehearsing the conclusions of the text to guide us into the text’s formal, 
mature body (Miller 11). Logo-centrism has to do with the focus on speech, the living breathing voice of 
the speaker, rather than writing, as the appropriate vehicle for truth. Where speech is the only vehicle for 
the true seed of knowledge, and writing represents a reckless dissemination or scattering of these seeds.  
This tension, between speech and writing, between reproductive and wasteful disseminations of 
knowledge, is not simply ambivalent, competing forces compelled in two opposing directions within the 
same libidinal economy as described in psychoanalysis, but rather it is an irreducible remainder, which 
unreconciled stands both outside and within the current systems, much as Derrida describes with his term 
hauntology—the haunting way the irreducible feature exists without and within but never becomes 
present. This lukewarm mixture, neither hot nor cold, nauseates us and we must therefore spit it out, reject 
it, and this is the very position as literary critics drawn into the tensions around deconstruction find 
ourselves in. And this is also very much the position of Hamlet or Antigone.  
 We find ourselves in an irreconcilable tension. Our current foundational figures instituted in the 
political turn have long been declared the new founders and many perceive that justice has been served to 
both deconstruction as well as inequity in textual reading. And with this turn, we have discovered 
inextricable linkages that entail obligations and prohibitions around our understanding of the corpus of 
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deconstruction. Any other burial that one may desire to pursue privately, to settle matters within their own 
home system without external reference to the political, are prohibited because the essence of the personal 
is both necessarily connected to and frustrated by the political. The personal finds itself under a demand 
to answer to established, universal sets of norms, which prevents it from being able to isolate and close 
itself off entirely. We then find ourselves suspended between multiple idioms. If we provide a socio-
political analysis of the text, we are accused by formalists of importing our preconceived modes of 
analysis and not accounting for the text on its own terms. If we focus on the text itself of the formalists, 
we are accused of sidestepping our political obligations and of consciously or unconsciously replicating 
dominant modes of power. If we pursue abstract philosophical questions, or ontological questions about 
being and our attempts to apprehend meaning, we can be equally accused by both formalists and political 
theorists of not doing justice to literary texts. Each idiom remains certain of its position and digs its 
bootheels firmly into its own ideological soil.  
Additionally, as systems become, or already have become, institutionalized, whether they be New 
Critical, existentialist, psychoanalytic, feminist, postcolonial, queer, or even deconstructive modes of 
analysis, their original insights have a tendency to lose their spirit and are often reduced to a residual, 
mechanical form of self-repetition. Standardized buzz words become an academic shorthand through 
which we signify our ideological commitments and thereby win respect and approval from others within a 
particular audience. As Derrida describes however, there is never just one deconstruction, and 
deconstruction, at its best, has served as a critique of the metaphysics of institutions rather than an 
institution itself. As he writes, “if a judge [becomes] a calculating machine—which happens—we will not 
say that he is just, free, and responsible” (Force of Law 961). Equally, if literary critics become 
calculating machines, endlessly processing texts under established modes of accounting, then we cannot 
say they are offering just interpretations, despite the quantity of texts they may turn out.  
 Using Heidegger’s concept of aporia and Derrida’s notion of the aporia of interpretation and 
connecting it with Derrida’s ontological claim of the haunting constitutive absence of the other, I argue 
there is always something radically arbitrary about interpretive choices and they are always open to 
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revision. The justice that is owed to the other, which the political modes declare themselves to have 
provided, is found not in interpretive standardizations but in the irreducible distance between the 
universal quality of interpretative systems and the singularity of the other. This irreducible element 
frustrates enclosure and entails that interpretation is never final or complete. In a Freudian mode, we 
might argue that at our foundations we have all been violently separated from the oceanic, 
undifferentiated state of early infancy, and reading is one way we express the drive to resolve that rift and 
find resolution and unity. In a productive attempt at resolution, we might, on an unconscious level that 
finds expression in religion, hope to follow the footsteps of the authors we read to the land of milk and 
honey, to a new promised land that brings us back to the nourishment, connection, and feelings of 
completeness we received in the arms of our earliest caretaker. On the destructive side of the same 
impulse, we may unconsciously intend to strangle our forefathers, to suffocate them with our modes of 
preservation, much like an entomologist mounting butterflies both idealizes and kills. Tracing Derrida 
back through Hegel, Nietzsche, Freud, and Heidegger, however, we follow Heidegger’s footsteps in 
Holzwege, not to unity or total destruction but to the passing moments of clearing. In the undecidable 
aporias we find in the interruption of passages, the moments where our throats tighten as we turn toward 
the other and struggle to find the last words or our first words, literary interpretation presents itself not as 







1 NEW CRITICSM: A FORMALIZED APPROACH TO LITERARY STUDIES 
1.1 Intro 
 The story of the institutionalization of literary studies in English departments in the US begins 
with the New Critics and the birth of a new foundation of authority, the text itself. The term New 
Criticism was coined by Ransom and applied to authors of the scholarly works he assembled in the 
anthology The New Criticism published in 1941 by New Directions. The common goal of scholars 
subsumed under the moniker New Critics was to establish a methodological, or in other words formal, 
basis through which claims about texts could be justified and subjected to critique by established common 
touchstones of interpretation in the field of literary studies. Although interpretive practices of New Critics 
vary, they share the expressed common objective to focus on the text itself as a unified, self-contained 
organic whole. Rather than simply discovering form in literature, which I define as a unified, self-same 
true essence to be found in literary works, the New Critics’ work formalizes literature; that is, their object 
of study and systematic approach to analysis founded upon and guided by the light of unified truth is a 
socially mediated process that plays an active role in shaping the very thing they claim to discover in 
literary texts. In this section, with reference to Derrida’s essay “Force of Law,” I provide a 
de/constructivist account of the particular mode of knowledge production instituted by the New Critics. 
As we will see, this conception of unified truth and the need for language to conform itself to a unified 
structure, in order to serve as the vehicle for truth, is directly drawing from Platonic metaphysics.   
 In this chapter, I will first introduce the New Critics, identify New Criticism’s relationship to 
Platonic metaphysical philosophy, and then use Derrida’s analysis of justice and law to analyze the 
structure of the revolution of New Criticism. Derrida’s essay “Force of Law” explores three themes that 
are essential to our discussion of literary interpretation. The first is an interrogation of the metaphysical 
foundations of law or norm guided systems. Derrida argues that despite references to greater authorities 
institutions are neither legal nor illegal, legitimate nor illegitimate, in their founding, revolutionary 
moment. It is only through a retroactive movement that an established institution can self-authorize its 
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foundations. The second is the question of the line between inside and outside of a text and internal vs 
external critique. The third, and most important, is the question of justice: what distinguishes a just 
interpretation from a violent misinterpretation of a text?  
1.2  Ransom, Plato, and the Metaphysics of Poetic Interpretation 
 John Crow Ransom’s seminal essay “Criticism, Inc.” published in the Autumn 1937 issue of the 
Virginia Quarterly Review sets out with this call to create and institutionalize a uniformed standard for 
interpretive practices. He states that literature needs to “become more scientific, or [in other words] 
precise and systematic” (I). As he describes, the field of literary studies in English departments in the US 
lacked a general formal approach to its proper object of analysis, literature. The issue, as he describes it, is 
that students “must be permitted to study literature, and not merely about literature” (II). By “about 
literature,” Ransom refers to two previously dominant streams in English departments. The first stream is 
composed of historical approaches, which includes biographical study, and the second, impressionistic 
readings that focus on the reader’s appreciation of the work. He argued that these approaches to literary 
analysis were a diversion that avoided a responsible study of literary works. The arguments advanced by 
Ransom, and others who are associated with New Criticism as a general movement, such as I.A. 
Richards, R.P Blackmore, Cleanth Brooks, and Robert Penn Warren, position the New Critics as both 
rebels and founders. The new Critics overturned previously established modes of criticism and replaced 
them with a systematic approach focused on the unity of the literary text. Their emphasis on form and 
formalism means they had an emphasis on applying a systematic analysis to what they identified as the 
structural features that contribute to the wholistic unity of literary texts.  
 We typically think of the New Critics’ formalism as offering an epistemology, a comprehensive 
theory of how to interpret literature, but New Criticism also offers a metaphysics, a philosophy about the 
nature of truth and the role of poetry and criticism in relationship to interpreting that truth. The New 
Critic’s metaphysical claim is that truth is a unified essence, and their epistemological work, rather than 
simply discovering unified truth, does the roll-up-your-sleeves, hard labor of reifying that a priori 
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metaphysical assumption. We might think of Hume’s comment in the Treatise that reason is a slave and 
“can never pretend to any office than to serve and obey” (636). This presumed metaphysical unity to be 
found embodied in texts serves two functions: it provides the ideological foundation for New Criticism 
and the justification that authorizes and presides over the ongoing production of its critique. The New 
Critical approach is founded and authorized under the metaphysical reference point to literary texts 
themselves, which they argued contain a wholistic, unified structure.  
 In “Criticism, Inc.”, Ransom defines the metaphysics of New Criticism and poetic work. He 
writes, “The critic should regard the poem as nothing short of a desperate ontological or metaphysical 
maneuver. The poet himself, in the agony of composition, has something like this sense of his labors. The 
poet perpetuates in his poem an order of existence which in actual life is constantly crumbling beneath his 
touch” (Criticism V). In this quote, Ransom defines for us the basic metaphysics of New Criticism: the 
nature of truth, poetic labor as revealing truth, what role the poet has in relationship to both truth and 
poetic labor, and the role of the critic in interpreting that truth. Although he doesn’t state it directly, the 
structure of Ransom’s metaphysics has the same basic structure of Plato’s metaphysics but with a 
substitution, the New Critic, rather than the philosopher, has access to universal truth.  
 Plato argues that the forms, which are beyond this world, are eternal, universal, and true, and the 
physical world, which is transitory, full of differences, and as Ransom writes “crumbling beneath [our] 
touch,” offers only a derivative mode of that truth (Criticism V). The philosopher, in Plato’s view, is able 
to access truth, to come in contact with it, through the method of the dialectic. When the philosopher 
engages in philosophical dialogue, he follows the dialectical process of collection and articulation. 
Collecting what initially appear to be unique and particular things according to their similarities, and then 
once understood as being a part of a greater whole, articulating that greater unity in terms of its parts.  
 According to Plato, when deep in philosophical contemplation, the philosopher participates in the 
form of truth like the individual cup participates in the universal cupness, he dwells in the form as 
universal truth. Plato considers this initial insight into truth to be a direct, prelinguistic relationship, which 
then is later represented by language. In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche describes this concept of the 
9 
immediacy between the philosopher and truth in Plato with the phrase “I Plato, am the truth” (20). But 
there lies a certain danger for the philosopher in relationship to the truth. The philosopher has a 
prelinguistic understanding of truth, is directly able to contemplate the forms, but he must rely on 
language to articulate that truth, and language itself is transitory and subject to various meanings and 
misinterpretations. Therefore, we are always in danger of distorting the truth or having the truth be 
misunderstood by our audience.  
 To contain this problem, Plato argues that the philosopher is of a higher order than the poet and 
emphasizes the role of spoken arguments. Poets labor over language to create pretty sounding 
arrangements of words, but these works can only be truly serious and valuable “if their compositions are 
based on knowledge of the truth, and they can defend or prove them, when they are put to the test, by 
spoken arguments…then they are to be called, not only poets, orators, legislators, but are worthy of a 
higher name, befitting the serious pursuit of their life…lovers of wisdom or philosophers'' (Phaedrus 
278c-d). In terms of communicating this truth, which is already whole, selfsame, and complete as a 
disembodied form, spoken argumentation or speech is the best vehicle. Speech, the philosopher’s speech 
to his audience, in order to be housed in truth, must have a structure, a form, that resembles truth. The 
speech must have an organic unity. He states, “every discourse ought to be a living creature, having a 
body of its own and a head and feet; there should be a middle, beginning, and end, adapted to one another 
and to the whole?” (Phaedrus 264c). This organic unity allows the speech of the philosopher to participate 
in the forms. Writing, on the other hand, is a lesser vehicle to speech because the living breathing 
philosopher, when he is there to speak in person, can rephrase his statements, answer questions, and 
provide further explanation. Writing cannot answer back and can be widely disseminated and subjected to 
endless misinterpretations from audiences that have no familiarity with its author and his spoken 
discourse. Where the philosophical dialectic unifies, finds the truth in the whole, writing fragments and 
scatters it seeds on rocky soil. Speech is the good origin and writing the wasteful, bad simulacra. 
 The work of the philosopher has two parts: the first is to understand the underlying unity beneath 
seemingly disjointed particular things, to comprehend “scattered particulars in one idea,” and the second 
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is the work, which he compares to the butcher, of carving up the organic whole at its joints in a way that 
breaks the whole down “according to the natural formation” rather than a badly imposed cut that splinters 
pieces of bone and ruins the meat (Phaedrus 265e). Ransom, like Plato, sees the interpretation of truth as 
dividing up the organic body under the sacrosanctity of the divine, eternal whole. Ransom describes the 
work of literary criticism as violence. He says the critic always has two goals in mind: ¨the prose core to 
which he can violently reduce the total object, and the differentia, residue, or tissue, which keeps the 
object poetical or entire¨ (Criticism V). Ransom argues that there is a "distinguishable logical object” or 
“universal” core to every poem and that the poet in their composition struggles to apprehend this truth 
which seems to crumble at their fingertips, always just out of reach for those in finite space and time. As 
the poet works at his verse, he attempts to wrangle in this extra-worldly, metaphysical (beyond the 
physical) truth. Ransom defines the poet’s style as the individual features he exhibits in his articulation of 
this universal truth, the particular, idiomatic features of his or her embodiment.  
 Ransom defines the work of the critic using Plato’s metaphor of the butcher dividing up a carcass. 
The term formalism for the New Critics offers a number of associations and meanings. Parker provides us 
a definition stating that formalism is an increased focus on “literary structure and language” and a 
decreased emphasis on “history, cultural context, biography, and politics” (Interpret Literature 25). In 
addition to this focus on literary structure, I argue that the term form has a platonic resonance. Like Plato, 
Ransom sees truth as a universal essence that is beyond the derivative physical incarnation of the poem, 
and his call for a formalist criticism is a call to reveal how that essence is reflected in material form by the 
poem. Ransom describes criticism as separating the "distinguishable logical object” or “universal” from 
the “irrelevant tissue from which it does not really emerge” (Criticism V). The truth has been embodied in 
organic form by the tissue of the poem, but truth does not arise from the body. The truth is real and 
eternal and the body in fleeting and contingent. Like a copy cannot produce an original, the body cannot 
give rise to the truth. The fleshy tissue holds the poem together in a derivative, organic reproduction of 
the divine, eternal form. The body of the poem must be understood as comprising a whole and then be 
separated and divided following the principles of unity in order to reveal the universal truth it simulates in 
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its organic unity. Ransom uses the terms technical effects and critical approach to define these technical, 
or in other words, basic physical components of a literary work, and the mode of interpretive 
argumentation that reveals their unity. As he writes, “The critic has to take the poem apart, or analyze it, 
for the sake of uncovering these [universal] features. With all the finesse possible, it is rude and patchy 
business by comparison with the living integrity of the poem. But without it there could hardly be much 
understanding of the value of poetry¨ (Criticism V). He sees the work as destroying an element of 
integrity of the poem, as destroying its beautiful artifice, but also as necessary in order to reveal the truth 
concealed in the poem.  
 The critic, much like the philosopher, probes beyond the beautiful surface of the poem in order to 
discover truth and interrogate the specific methods behind the poem’s attempt to capture this truth. 
Unlike, Plato, Ransom sees the poet as deeply engaged in universal truth but requiring the work of 
criticism to get at the abstract universal. Ransom defines the poet’s style as the particular organic aspects 
encompassing the universal core the poet attempts to capture. Style, he writes, “is a comprehensive word, 
and probably means: the general character of his irrelevances, or tissues. All his technical devices 
contribute to it, elaborating or individualizing the universal, the core-object; likewise all his material 
detail” (V). Style is the particular, contingent way the poet embodies the universal in his work. 
1.3 Revolution: From Fugitives to Justice 
 The turn toward formalism was a revolution in literary studies. It was a radical upturning and 
rearranging of the basic principles and practices in the field, and it has had a lasting impact long after the 
halcyon days of New Criticism in the period from the 1930s to the 1950s. Derrida, following Walter 
Benjamin as well as Nietzsche and Marx, sees violence as the essential feature of both revolution and the 
function of maintaining organized systems. He uses the terms law-founding and law-preserving violence, 
adapted from Benjamin’s essay “A Critique of Violence,” to describe the double action of revolution. 
There is always a violence involved in upturning the established law—in this case I broaden the term to 
describe the norm guided practices that structure reading—and the violence necessary to institute and 
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continuously enforce the new order. In this section, I first argue that rather than simply discovering form 
in literature, or the unified, self-same text itself, the New Critics’ work formalizes literature. I then move 
on to show how Derrida’s understanding of the violence of foundations necessitates the inexhaustible 
demand of justice. Because institutions are always ungrounded, we can never definitively close the door 
on justice. Justice steals after us in our loneliest loneliness—addresses us in our irreducible singularity—
and demands that we once more and innumerable times retrace the interpretive pathways that organize 
and guide our passages through texts.  
 Like any metaphysics, New Criticism entails violence, a violence at the very establishment of its 
understanding of what foundationally and definitively is, its primordial stance on the nature of truth and 
reality. This violence is essential to the creation and the preservation of the law. But there is always a 
tension to be found in the law, in the violence of enforcing laws: the question whether or not the particular 
application of violence that constitutes and enforces any particular universal law in any singular situation 
is just or unjust. Following Montaigne and Pascal, Derrida explores the paradoxical relationship between 
law and justice, whether laws can be just or whether justice is simply the law of the strongest, simply a 
mystified excuse for power (Force of Law 939). Through the tensions between law and justice, Derrida 
remains committed to an ideal of justice, but an ideal to be found both within and beyond the messy 
contingent aspects of the world. By working with the paradoxical tensions between law and justice, he 
argues that justice is neither some abstract yard-stick found in a magic omniscient space beyond the 
physical world nor is it simply reducible to a function of systems and power. Justice exists in the space of 
interpretation, in the “absence of rules and definitive criteria that would allow one to distinguish 
univocally between droit (law and right) and justice” (Force of Law 923). Derrida sees justice as a 
metaphysical question that must be taken up by interpretation. A Levinasian question of how we address 
ourselves to the singularity of the being of the other. By address Derrida means our ability to direct 
ourselves to others on the basis of mutual recognition rather than in terms of a one sided drive for 
recognition expressed in mastery and servitude. Where the New Critics appeal to unity and the self-same 
as justice—in finding the unity of the text, they take themselves to have accurately addressed the 
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singularity of its meaning—Derrida shows justice to be found in irreducibility, in the lack of a singular 
essence of meaning. There is always some irreducible aspect of the other, and in our attempts to address 
the other, there is always something idiomatic and singular about them and their existence, some quality 
unmasterable by any system of interpretation. It is in this irreducible space, within the impossibility of a 
definitive justice, that justice operates.  
  As a force of law, New Criticism requires justification by an appeal to justice. It must present 
itself as the legitimate application of law. As we will see, the text itself provides the metaphysical 
foundation and justification of New Critical practices. By violence, I don’t mean anyone being dragged to 
the guillotine or shot in a firing line. But decisions about what is the object of criticism and what qualifies 
as criticism have both theoretical and material consequences: decisions about what articles and books get 
published, who is considered for faculty positions, who gets promoted and who gets quietly ushered out 
the door, what qualifies as good student work and merits good grades, whose classes are popular and have 
large enrollment numbers, what departments get funding, etc. As Derrida describes, law requires force, it 
isn’t a law if it isn’t enforced.  
 Not all of the New Critics were personal friends or colleagues, but a concentrated core of the 
movement, including Ransom, were a part of the Fugitives, the initial group of poets in Nashville. 
Drawing from the name and spirit of this group, The Fugitive is also the title of Ransom’s literary journal. 
The name is taken from a poem by Hirsch. Allen Tate gives a definition of the ideal writing, “a Fugitive 
was quite simply a Poet: the Wanderer, or even the Wandering Jew, the Outcast, the man who carries the 
secret wisdom around the world" (Cowan 44). This initial stance of operating outside the given law is 
always necessary for the creation of a new institution. Rebellion, the violence of rebellion, whether in the 
form of a general labor strike or famous criminals like Bonnie and Clyde or Al Capone, who openly 
flaunt the law and even garner public support, are bound to become a special focus of state suppression. 
The state must put down this kind of violence because “the secret wisdom” we might say it carries is the 
capacity to overturn the state and create new laws (Force of Law 985). Ransom embraced the idea that 
what they were doing was rebellious, the work of an outlaw, a fugitive. “Criticism, Inc.” has a polemic 
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spirit. In the essay, we get broad iconoclastic shots fired at the established modes of literary criticism, 
knocking them down as fundamentally insufficient. Beyond this rebellion against established norms of 
criticism, the New Critics are responsible for constructing a formal epistemology of literary interpretation. 
And this is the double movement of revolution. It both flaunts established law but also necessarily 
institutes a new law. In this way, the New Critics and Ransom in particular are, as Leitch writes, 
“harbingers of the professionalization of literary analysis that characterized mid- and late-twentieth-
century U.S. literary culture” (Norton 1107). They set out with the expressed goal of establishing a 
universal methodological basis, i.e. the norm guided practices, through which claims about texts can be 
justified and subjected to both verification and critique from professional peers in the field of literary 
studies (Criticism I).  
 Two main features of their analysis, the call to examen the text itself as well as close reading, 
place the text at the center as the foundation and justification for their approach. Close reading is the 
primary method the New Critics apply in analyzing literary texts. The practice seeks to start primarily 
with the text and to support claims about the text by relying exclusively on supporting evidence from the 
text itself rather than an appeal to things outside the text. As Kenneth Burke described, the New Critics 
sought a methodology for an intrinsic rather than extrinsic textual critique. The text itself, rather than the 
external historical context or the internal, subjective reactions of the reader, become the primary object of 
study. In a broad sense, these methods can generally be understood as starting with technical features of 
the literary work, such as image, metaphor, tone, paradox, ambiguity, tension, and irony, and working to 
demonstrate how these features contribute to an over-arching meaning of the work as whole. In 
“Criticism, Inc.” Ransom defines criticism not by asking “What is criticism?” but instead asking “What is 
criticism not?” (IV). Interesting enough, this point is very similar to Saussure’s insight that the meaning 
of what is said also importantly involves what is not said (Course 120). So rather than a simple revelation 
of the text itself in shinning truth, Ransom offers a two-fold distancing: not what the text itself is, but 
what an interpretation of the text itself is not. He defines the text itself through its relation to those dirty 
rotten other ways of reading texts. The methods that New Criticism excludes include, personal 
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registrations that deal with the “effect of the art-work upon the critic as reader,” synopsis and paraphrase, 
which Ransom describes as the delight of “high school classes and the women’s clubs,” historical studies, 
which include biographical studies, linguistic studies, moral studies, which include Aristotelian ethics, 
Christianity, and Marxist political-economic interpretations—Ransom refers to Marxism as the 
“proletarian gospel”—and any other special studies that deal with some abstract or prose content taken 
out of the work—by this he describes areas that deviate from textual analysis and investigate aspects of 
the author’s life and personal hobbies. He also includes philosophy as being a mode of analysis external 
to the text, and outside of the work of literary criticism, in that philosophy deals in generalizations rather 
than the particulars of a given text. His concern is that a philosopher would simply be drawing from “their 
prior philosophical stock” rather than approaching the text on its own terms (Criticism I). Ransom’s digs 
and outright dismissals of what were major approaches to studying literature up to that point make it clear 
he is out for mutiny not compromise.  
 To provide some context to Ransom’s polemical opposition, it helps to understand what literary 
studies looked like before New Criticism. Parker provides some illuminating descriptions of this period in 
literary studies (Interpret Literature 13-16). Prior to New Criticism, Literature departments had a wide 
variety of approaches without any overarching, uniform methodology. Courses would view literary texts 
in a variety of ways, some approached literary works as moral guides to be read didactically, others would 
focus on impressionistic readings, others would engage in philological analysis of the language in the 
work, more history centered courses would focus on the writer’s biography and the people and works his 
or her work draws on, and some would focus on appreciation of the work by reading the work out loud in 
a spirited way in class. Ransom saw all these approaches in-themselves as foundationally insufficient. He 
states, “We feel certain that the critical act is not one of those which the professors of literature habitually 
perform, and cause their students to perform” (Criticism IV). Perhaps aspects of these approaches could 
be applied in a critical reading, but they all needed to be subsumed under the guiding logos of formal 
literary criticism. They needed to be organized and directed by an argument that offers a unified 
interpretation of the text. 
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 This work of the literary critic dedicated to intrinsic textual critique also involved a great deal of 
extrinsic reorganization. It was a call for the redefinition of literary studies. The various disciplines  
practiced within literary studies underwent a uniform standardization of the material labor and norms 
guiding the discipline. Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren were extremely interested in the 
pedagogical application and wrote books, including An Approach to Literature, Understanding Poetry, 
and Understanding Fiction, as a response to what they considered to be a disturbing inability of students 
to analyze a literary work when presented without the author’s name or historical context. Additionally, 
New Criticism was especially oriented to the study of poetry and its interest in poetry not only depended 
on the fact that many of the New Critics, like Ransom, were poets themselves, but also involved the 
practical pedagogical restraints of the classroom setting—professors can make productive use of class 
time and maintain student interest and active participation by leading critical readings of multiple poems 
in a single class session. The act of defining literary criticism also re-constituted what we study as 
literature. New Criticism favored particular groups of texts such as the metaphysical poets at the expense 
of others, such as the Romantic and Victorian poets. And it was especially suited to difficult modernist 
works, such as the poetry of Yeats and Eliot. In his 1952 essay, “An Age of Criticism,” Ransom describes 
this as a retrospective process where some works “prove studier than we knew while others lose 
substance”(New Republic 1952). Among these he mentions that modern movements in criticism “confer 
new life upon Dickinson, Hawthorne, Melville, and James” and explains that critics also “find desiccation 
in other writers once fully as reputable” (New Republic 1952). Rather than saying that works under the 
light of New Criticism were revealed to be lacking in substance, it would be more accurate to say that 
particular works previously highly regarded by traditionalists, such as poems by Keats, which have a 
certain delicate beauty to them, didn’t conform well to or benefit from the probing New Critical 
approaches, whereas modernist poetry, with lines that “follow like a tedious argument,” and literary 
works that require detailed analysis to tease out their meaning did.  
 So to get to my point about New Criticism, despite the New Critics view that their foundation was 
the text itself, it turns out this foundation was neither self-evident nor present in-itself at all but was rather 
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a retroactive product of their own institutionalization of a theoretical framework. Drawing on the insights 
of phenomenology, we could say that what New Critics call the inside or the text itself was always already 
constituted by its outside, through a highly mediated relationship to literary others. It’s precisely within 
the impossibility of drawing definitive borders between these terms internal and external, speech-writing, 
origin-copy, and the whole hierarchy of the metaphysical great chain of being of truth-philosopher-
audience or truth-poet-literary critic, that Derrida finds justice.  
 In tracing the distinction between law-founding and law-preserving violence in Benjamin’s essay, 
Derrida finds the impossibility of metaphysical singularity, singularity as a unified, self-same essence, 
and affirms an irreducible singularity, various currents of thought and action that cannot be subsumed 
under the concept of the same. Each founding moment is without ground and each preserving moment is 
unfounded. But rather than this resulting in nihilism, this groundlessness, this lack of a center, entails an 
absolute freedom and responsibility to justice: “Deconstruction is justice” (Force of Law 945). This is a 
strange, even self-indulgent, phrase from Derrida. It also appears to offer a kind of one-upmanship, 
answering the question of whether or not deconstruction can provide us a guide to justice with the 
pronouncement “my philosophy is justice.” But this phrase is not to affirm deconstruction as some final 
system, as an ultimate and superior set of principles authorized by the name Derrida. Rather, it affirms 
what Derrida cannot control. It is in deconstruction’s failure to provide a unified interpretive framework 
and find a singular and definitive essence in any text that it can be understood as justice. Because 
interpretation is free, always operating in the gap between each individual blade-like flattened item on the 
end of a stem and what we call a leaf, then the act of naming, the leap of naming, of addressing others in 
their singularity through social-linguistic conceptual structures always entails a responsibility. This 






2 “WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?” AND HOW IS IT RELEVANT TO ENGLISH LITERATURE 
DEPARTMENTS? 
In his essay “What is Metaphysics?”, Heidegger argues that the “only meaningful source of 
unity” of the multiple disciplines in the modern university is provided by “the practical establishment of 
goals by each discipline” (I). The way each department, or even each of the disciplines under the house of 
each department, approaches its object of inquiry differs fundamentally, but the taking of an object is 
essential to all. The disciplines, or using the more classical term, the sciences, in the broad sense, all 
approach knowledge by studying beings themselves, i.e. specific things, specific objects of study. This 
object of study becomes the primary source of understanding as well as the source of new breakthroughs 
in understanding. As Heidegger describes, the investigation of things necessarily involves an exclusion, 
the exclusion of non-things. He writes, “precisely in the way scientific man secures to himself what is 
most properly his, he speaks of something different. What should be examined are beings only, and 
besides that—nothing” (What is Metaphysics I). The scientific modes of knowledge refer themselves to 
things and to nothing outside or beyond that. Heidegger asks however, what is this nothing that a science, 
in referring to its object, does not refer to. This takes us into his foundational question of metaphysics. 
When I talk about beings, what remains unsaid?  Heidegger is interested in the non-thing that is not 
studied by the very taking of an object of study, how our epistemology always already assumes a 
metaphysics. In this chapter, I show how Heidegger’s critique of the disciplines relates to his foundational 
understanding of truth as Alethia.  
The disciplines present themselves as engaged in freely chosen modes of investigation and as 
involved in the foundational search of human inquiry into what is essential in their particular objects of 
study. Heidegger rightly identifies this acceptance of the diversity of approaches as foundational to the 
scientific worldview, both in the broad and narrow sense of the term. As biology can keep on studying 
organisms, and physicists physical motion, and quantum physics can study the radically different 
phenomena that occur on the quantum level without any real disturbance to their respective fields, 
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historians can study concrete history, linguists language, and anthropologists human culture, and literary 
critics literature, so long as their methods reveal the truth of their objects. This liberty is essential to the 
free spirit of investigation and has been the foundational challenge to and uprooting of traditional 
worldviews and inherited beliefs.  
 Part of the source of this liberty that both founds and sustains a diversity of approaches to 
understanding is that despite the common need to select an object of study, there remains meaningful 
divisions between interpretive practices. Imposing the methods from one discipline directed to its object 
onto another discipline with its own object can, at times, result in a violent distortion. To support his 
argument, Heidegger offers an example of the difference between mathematical knowledge and 
philological-historical knowledge. Where math demands a mode of “exactness,” it does not undermine 
the value and standard of rigor of philological-historical studies. As he says, “to demand exactness in the 
study of history is to violate the idea of the specific rigor of the humanities” (I). So, where a mathematical 
proof follows deductive reasoning to arrive at logical certainty, the rigor of philological investigation 
recognizes polysemy and the possibility of the meanings of words changing with usage over time. Or as 
Nietzsche writes, words are “pockets, into which this or that or several things have been stuffed at once!” 
(Human 212). If one were to attempt to import the kind of axiomatic deductive problem solving we see in 
math onto philological history, it wouldn’t make for a better philological history. It would instead distort 
that particular object of inquiry.  
 Despite this perceived freedom, Heidegger sees a foundational lack of freedom. In electing an 
object of study, we foundationally assume a particular interpretation of the nature of reality. The issue that 
Heidegger sees is that being is not a thing. Rather than something that is understood as present, being 
reveals itself in absence, being is a non-thing. The disciplines mistake being as something which can be 
understood as an object of study. To correct this error, Heidegger argues that we must go beyond the 
traditional understanding of truth in philosophy that is applied across the disciplines known as the 
correspondence theory of truth and instead view truth as Alethia. Heidegger takes special concern with 
the correspondence theory of truth as a product of both Plato and the modern influence of Cartesianism 
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and seeks to recover a presocratic Greek notion of truth as Alethia, as unconcealment. This discussion of 
the structure of academic disciplines connects with Heidegger’s understanding of truth as Alethia as 
playing a pragmatic role in how we engage with being. He draws a distinction between ontic, or our 
socially acquired modes of understanding that structure the way we view things, i.e. objects, and 
ontological understanding, as our more primary, practical relationship to being.  
 Following the correspondence theory, we describe statements as true because they confer with the 
way the world actually is in this moment, how facts in the world confirm our claims about the world. As 
John Searle explains the “cat is on the mat” is a true statement if it corresponds to there being an actual 
cat on the actual mat, or as he writes, “there will be a condition in the world that meets the requirement” 
to make the statement “the cat is on the mat” true, and the term we have for that condition in the world is 
the word fact (212). As in right now it’s 3 PM, Wednesday afternoon, and it’s 78 degrees Fahrenheit 
outside, and I, as a perceiving, thinking subject, am present to make these observations. These facts 
however, although they appear to be simple, everyday, and immediately comprehensible, depend upon a 
complex network of social arrangements that makes them possible. They are all things that can be 
measured, weighed out, and standardized. These activities of measuring and weighing all involve a social 
history of development, from the development of unform weights, the clock and the standardization of 
time, and the development of other tools and technology necessary for performing these tasks. These facts 
then are founded in a practical activity within the world that precedes supposedly transparent and neutral 
observation. They also, without acknowledging it, take a position on the nature of both being and time. 
When we accept the correspondence theory of truth, and thereby overlook these background practices, we 
enter into what Heidegger calls the metaphysics of presence. 
  In Being and Time, Heidegger describes the way that in our common mode of everday existence 
we are presented with metaphysical truth in terms of what he calls present-at-hand beings, as objectified, 
consumable facts about the world, and contrasts that with ready-to-hand doing. He argues that peasant 
artisans have a more foundational connection with being. When the artisan is engaged directly with his 
craft, he’s not aware of himself in a way that Descartes describes the subject, and his hammer, rather than 
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being some thing he knows a bunch of facts about, is a transparent action, hammering. He is also not 
concerned with the clock or the uniformly measured out socially necessary labor time guiding the 
production of the factory worker. His activity, rather than being understood in the present, as something 
here and now, is guided by a tradition of activity, and his work is a mode of interpreting that tradition in a 
future directed way. If we think of Alice Walker’s story “Everyday use,” Maggie would represent this 
more essential form of authenticity. She has learned the process of quilting by hand and therefore can 
inherit and use the family quilts and repair them as needed without having to guard and preserve them as 
present-at-hand museum piece as Dee would like to do. This active know-how knowledge of the craft 
person for Heidegger is the basis of the most authentic relationship one can have to truth. Only in the 
moment that the craft-person’s hammer breaks would he become aware of it as an object present and 
available to be measured, weighted, or categorized.  
 In his view, the disciplines in the university are metaphysical because they exchange an authentic 
relationship with being for a relationship with an object of study. For Heidegger, this relationship with 
building is a kind of poetics because the artisan can bring out what is genuine and beautiful about the 
materials he works with. This stands in contradiction to the objectifying way that technology views the 
world: the way technology reduces all things into material to be optimized, as material to be made more 
efficient, easily repeatable, and standardized. As Heidegger scholar Iain Thomson describes, "If I think 
nature around me is nothing but meaningless stuff waiting to be optimized, then why shouldn't I just put a 
nice, big hotel here, make a lot of money, all the people can see the ocean. The idea that there's something 
there independently of me is something you have to cultivate and develop a sensitivity to. I think that's 
what a poet does, the poet is sort of the paradigmatic instance of the person who's learned a receptivity to 
things independent of us” (Ruspoli 1:04:00). Heidegger’s idea is that the artisan or master of a skill, is 
able to connect with a foundational poesis of being, is able to bring out this vibrant unfolding of being.  
 We can see in Heidegger’s basic ontic-ontological distinction between things and being the 
tension that New Criticism is stuck between. On one side, New Criticism hopes to have a more craft-
based approach to studying literature, and at the same time, it remains committed to truth as 
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correspondence. New Criticism’s desire to divorce itself from history would also be challenged since 
Heidegger argues that the form itself, the discipline’s taking an object of study, is both temporal and 
spatial, it has a space and time. The object is present, it is here and now. History is also a primary concern 
for Ransom, despite his desire to exclude it. He is concerned with the history of the discipline, he turns 
toward the past, literary works written in the past and past ways of studying literature, with a view 
directed toward our future reproduction of the discipline, and thereby present a new understanding of our 
present activities. In terms of spatially, we have physical spaces where the study of literature occurs, 
libraries, classrooms, etc., but we also have a spatiality in our relationship to the text when we talk about 
close reading. Of course close reading doesn’t mean that we literally place the text against our face as we 
read it, but it does have a spatiality in terms of the way our investigation seeks to be in-depth or inside 
rather than remaining simply on the surface or outside. This spatiality seeks to be more intimately 
entwined with the nuance and detail of the text.  
Heidegger uses the term Ent-fernung to describe the more primary way we are spatial and 
temporal; i.e. how it is that objects appear to us as ready-to-hand within a meaningful context at all. The 
literal translation of entfernung means distance, but Heidegger inserts a hyphen into the word, which 
emphasizes a separation between the negative prefix ent, which means to abolish or take away, from the 
stem fern, which means remote or distant. This separation conveys a double sense of both establishing 
and abolishing distance (Dreyfus 130). Macquarrie and Robinson derive the English translation by 
modifying the English word dissever, to separate, to de-sever, which would mean to negate separation or 
abolish distance (138n2). Heidegger uses de-severance to describe the act and essential tendency we have 
to bring objects close to serve a particular purpose. This tendency to bring things close however, is not 
simply a matter of us bringing an object close to ourselves in terms of physical, measurable distance, or 
close to our physical body. He says, “[b]ringing close is not oriented towards the I-Thing encumbered 
with a body, but concernful Being-in-the-world” (Being and Time 107). By bringing close (de-severance), 
Heidegger is describing the way that we bring objects in space into a relationship in which the objects are 
available to be used for a particular end or set of ends. He provides an example of someone building a 
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sunroom to bring the sun close to emphasize this point (Being and Time 137). When I build a sunroom, I 
do not physically bring the sun closer, but rather establish a kind of relationship with the room and 
windows and the sun that transforms the space into a place to-enjoy-the-sun. When I encounter the space 
where I want to build the sun room, I might first see it as a possible sunny space without even thinking of 
myself, but rather thinking purely in terms of aspects of the space. As I work to create the space, I become 
engaged in the work and see the objects around and my body in their ready-to-hand relevance to the task. 
It’s not until later, when I’m sitting in a chair for too long and feel hot and sunburned that I might find 
myself as an I in reference to the arranged space around me. I might then identify, following the 
correspondence theory of truth, that the sun, an object, caused, me, a subject, to become sunburnt. In this 
way, the sense of I and the physical proximity of objects to my body are secondary, and often occur as a 
result of an interruption, to our more primary, ready-to-hand spatiality. 
We can similarly provide a phenomenological account of practices of reading. Interpretation of 
texts isn’t first and primarily founded on formalism; rather, literary interpretation springs from the poesis 
of our being in the world in a meaningful way. The way in which truth as Alethia is revealed through 
meaningful action. As Heidegger writes, Dasein is the being “that, in its very being, being is an issue for 
it” (Being and Time 32). He uses the term Dasein, which means being-there, for the self to avoid the 
Cartesian metaphysical connotations of the self. What Heidegger means is that in our being, the essence 
of who we are, we are concerned with the question of meaning: why is there something “and not just 
nothing?” (What is Metaphysics? 12). This essence, however, isn’t a soul or something self-same and 
present, it is an absence, a lack of being. It’s because we lack an objective essence, a stable sense of self-
same isness, that we have a question of meaning. For Heidegger, this meaning is not something we can 
avoid. As Dasein, we are inherently concerned with meaning. The world is meaningful to us and there’s 
no escaping that. Formalist literary analysis arises, then, out of this greater context of collective meaning 
but attempts to objectify the text, to master it according to a system. For Heidegger not just literature but 
language itself is something that cannot be mastered in this way, because it is the existential foundation of 
our being in the world. We are the kind of beings for whom the meaning of being is a question. 
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As Heidegger sees truth as Alethia as an authentic mode of being that stands in contradiction to a 
derivative correspondence theory of truth, we can start to see what Derrida considers to be metaphysical 
about Heidegger’s work. Where Plato imagines some pre-linguistic connection between the philosopher 
and the truth and the living, breathing logos, the spoken word of the present philosopher being the only 
true appropriate medium for communicating this truth, Heidegger also imagines some pure relationship 
with being communicated not through philosophical reflection about an object but through the authentic 
master in active practice of his craft. In a certain way, this involves a lack of presence, but it also assumes 
a more direct organic unity with truth. For Heidegger, the Cartesian subject is not present in these 
moments of action because subject and object become transparent. Instead of the predicative sentence “I 
am hammering,” there exists just a pure state of transparent action with no present subject standing 
separate from the activity, hammering. For Heidegger, it is only when we are interrupted, when the 
hammer is broken in some way, that we enter into the state of division between a self-present I and a 
present thing like a hammer. Heidegger sees the I as showing up as a burden and as an interruption to our 
activities. As we will see, Derrida challenges this notion of pure being vs interruption and, in other words, 










3 HEIDEGGER, NIETZSCHE, DERRIDA 
If we take a step back and look at the Heideggerian elements in Derrida’s work and Derrida’s 
critique of Heidegger, we can gain closer insight into Derrida’s deconstruction of the metaphysical 
tradition. In Derrida’s book Spurs, Derrida examines the metaphysical aspects of Heidegger’s thought. 
Derrida’s concern is that in parts Heidegger presents being as a foundational signified. Heidegger’s ontic-
ontological distinction has a tendency to present ontological being as a kind of arche-foundation that 
precedes the ontic categories of beings (Grammatology 20). This metaphysical view in Heidegger 
becomes most direct in his two-volume work entitled Nietzsche. In the work, Heidegger argues that 
Nietzsche is the last philosopher of the metaphysical tradition of philosophy and that he, Heidegger, is the 
first to genuinely liberate being from metaphysical determinations. This view depends upon reading 
Nietzsche’s work as a totalizing whole with a foundational metaphysics that unifies his work with the 
concept of the will to power. Derrida responds to this reading by undermining the unified view of 
Nietzsche and showing how Nietzsche is in fact more disruptive to the metaphysical tradition than 
Heidegger. This critique importantly turns on what Heidegger does not explore or attempt to account for 
in Nietzsche’s work, the representation of women and a focus on style in Nietzsche’s writing. Derrida 
argues that in Nietzsche’s writing, style is not subsumed to logos. Nietzsche’s stylistic multiplicity and 
heterogeneity resist systematization and cannot be reduced under one logos or made present and available 
to one, singular truth. Derrida reads Nietzsche against Heidegger and reveals Nietzsche to be a thinker of 
difference.  
Spurs draws heavily form the passage “How the True World became a Fiction: The History of an 
Error” in Nietzsche’s the Twilight of Idols. Focusing on Nietzsche’s statement about the femininity of 
truth in this passage, Derrida turns to a discussion of women in Nietzsche’s work and Nietzsche’s margin 
note “I have forgotten my umbrella” in the Nachlass, his unpublished notebooks. Nietzsche writes that 
when philosophy moves from the Platonic to the Christian conception of truth that truth “becomes 
woman” (23). This feminine turn in truth is the historical transition in philosophy from truth being 
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immediately present to “the sage, the pious, the virtuous man,” summarized by the statement “I Plato am 
the Truth,” to truth becoming “unattainable for now” but promised to arrive later for “the sage, the pious, 
the virtuous man” (23). This introduction of the feminine into the male centered origins of Platonic 
philosophy means the introduction of delay and deferral as well as subtleness and incomprehensibility. It 
is also importantly the linguistic, spatial, and historical instantiation of truth. In Nietzsche’s view, this 
introduction of delay creates an internal conflict for philosophy. Although the philosopher tries, he cannot 
return to an immediate, prelinguistic dwelling in the truth described by Plato, so he moves in a further 
direction and abolishes the metaphysical true world, but in so doing he also abolishes the apparent world, 
the world of appearances and masks. In our dichotomy between truth and appearance, truth and falsity, 
we find that the concepts are understood in their relation and that one cannot be eradicated without 
undermining the other. Nietzsche suggests that we can move beyond this dichotomy when we understand 
truth as the appearance of truth. This would mean an end to the phallogocentric economy of philosophical 
truth. Because it follows that appearance, style, performance, associated with women, could not be 
mastered or subsumed under a definitive understanding of unveiled truth.  
Picking up on Nietzsche’s theme, Derrida’s text focuses on two tripartite configurations that of 
style-spurs-women and the proper names Heidegger-Nietzsche-Derrida. These two configurations 
exchange truth as a fetishized exchange value between themselves, much as the philosopher hopes to 
arrive at truth unveiled in its ideal, material, ontological, or other terms describing a foundational, fixed, 
and definitive form. In Heidegger’s discussion of truth as Alethia, he describes ontic, present-at-hand, 
determinations of beings as a derivative and impoverished mode of understanding being which he hopes 
to unveil and arrive at truth itself. In Nietzsche, Heidegger argues that Nietzsche presents the will to 
power as a foundational metaphysics and the eternal recurrence as the mode through which that 
foundational essence is expressed (Vol I: 4). This allows Heidegger to present his own destruction of 
metaphysics as the first philosophy to subvert the metaphysical tradition and arrive at truth. Not only is 
this framing of Nietzsche incorrect it also relies heavily on a falsification of Nietzsche’s work. 
Philosophers have always had an ambivalent relationship to Nietzsche, with their main source of 
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frustration being the multiple and dynamic ways in which he writes, using a multiplicity of voices, styles, 
and characters. In order to be conceived as a genuine philosopher, many philosophers hoped that a work 
would be produced that proves that Nietzsche had a unified system (Behler 13). This pressure motivated 
the publication of the Will to Power, which was a work created by selecting and extracting passages from 
various parts of Nietzsche’s unpublished notebooks and assembled them into a unified whole. But as the 
editors Mazzino Montinari and Giorgio Colli themselves stated, the manuscript is a fraud (Behler 13). 
The writings have not been altered, but the process of omission and piecing together to create a coherent 
unity involves a falsification. Heidegger, although aware of this issue, and even recognizing the 
falsification himself, repeats the view of a unified Nietzsche in his own work (Behler 14).  
Derrida sees Nietzsche as important for disrupting self-same identity, truth, and the autonomous 
subject, and instead revealing an economy of differing and deferring drives. He brings our attention to 
what is divergent and multiple in Nietzsche’s work as well as efforts at understanding Nietzsche as 
unified. Derrida introduces the word spur into the discussion as a metaphor to describe two branching 
aspects of Nietzsche’s text that ultimately lead to moments of undecidability. He also discusses the 
margin note “I have forgotten my umbrella” in Nietzsche’s notebook to explore the boundary between 
inside and outside the text. The style-spur and the irreducible quality of this supplemental margin note 
frustrate both the unified view of Nietzsche as well as Heidegger’s concept of truth. One bifurcating spur 
Derrida locates in Nietzsche’s text is the paradoxical notion that woman does not believe in truth even 
though she has come to represent truth in the eyes of the male philosopher. A second Spur is the 
philosophical drive toward systemization in order to pin down truth and truth’s irreducibility. Nietzsche’s 
text resists the idea that there is an essence to truth or women. He sees the spur and style as related in that 
both are an object that divide and distance, as well as point. Derrida writes, “style-spur, the spurring style, 
is a long object, an oblong object, a word, which perforates even as it parries. It is the oblong—foliated 
point (a spur or a spar) which derives its apotropaic power from the taut, resistant tissues, webs, sails and 
vails which are erected, furled and unfurled around it” (Spurs 41). Derrida defines his discussion of style 
around the stylus, the phallic pointed object wielded by the male philosopher as the traditional master of 
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truth and authority: “In the question of style there is always the weight of examen of some pointed object. 
At times this object might be only a quill or a stylus. But it could just as easily be a stiletto, or even a 
rapier. Such objects might be used in a vicious attack against what philosophy appeals to in the name of 
matter or matrix, an attack whose thrust could not but leave its mark” (Spurs 37). Derrida identifies the 
stylus as the tool and mechanism through which the male philosopher inscribes his thought and 
reproduces his name as an author of philosophy. Derrida begins a play of substitutions of the signifier, 
noting the various signifieds it can point out (Spurs 41). He mentions that a stiletto could be a stylus, 
blood red perhaps to suggest the fear of a female reversal of penetration, or as Freud describes the fetish 
whose prototype is the penis of the mother, the penis the child believes the mother has until he finds it 
absent and must substitute it with the fetish, or even a rapier, a weapon designed to thrust and penetrate. 
In Nietzsche’s work, Derrida finds a subversion of style, a style which undermines philosophy’s quest to 
arrive at truth through a process of systematization that pins down and captures truth. Derrida argues that 
the spur is also an umbrella. For Derrida, the umbrella is also the unifying term—the umbrella concept 
often refers to the generalization that presides over the particulars—for Derrida in the text of Nietzsche, 
as a margin note “I have forgotten my umbrella,” as the style-spur, it becomes that which supplements the 
text, the remainder that is irreducible and idiomatic and cannot be reduced to a unified view of Nietzsche.  
At the same time, however, truth remains veiled, unattainable, inaccessible, it merely threatens to 
become present. It also threatens castration, to reveal itself as castrated, as absence, lack of presence, as 
untruth and lie. Neither presence nor absence arrive in a definitive form. Truth as female in Nietzsche’s 
writing plays at castration, but also realizes that to castrate would bring her back into the phallogocentric 
economy of the male philosopher (Spurs 61). Instead, Nietzsche argues, she uses castration’s effect. She 
plays at castration at the same time she plays at unveiling truth in its definitive and fixed form. Truth 
dances, but it is the phallocentric narrative that fears and assumes this dance will result in either castration 
or revelation of truth as presence. In the biblical story of Salome we see this male-centered narrative and 
fear. Salome’s dance of the seven veils seduces Herod, the king, master of truth and the royal line, into 
making a blind promise, a commitment to do whatever she requests without knowledge of whether her 
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request will be just or unjust. Herod does not listen to the signs and the warnings from others, he follows 
too closely, does not keep the proper distance, he places too much meaning in the promise of her beauty, 
he blindly invests his word, the spoken word of the king, the proper line of the logos, without any 
guarantee from Salome about what she will ask of him in return. And the result is castration. She asks for 
the head of John the Baptist to be brought to her on a platter. 
Nietzsche undermines the metaphysical narrative of truth in his photo with Lou Andreas-Salomé, 
the Russian born psychoanalyst and Nietzsche’s love interest, and Paul Rée and Nietzsche. According to 
Salomé’s memoir Looking Back, Nietzsche arranged the photo in a playful mood (111). Salomé wields a 
phallic object, a whip, and drives Rée and Nietzsche like horses. As Derrida writes, “Because woman is 
(her own) writing, style must return to her. In other words, it could be said that if style were a man (much 
as the penis, according to Freud is the ‘normal prototype of fetishes’), then writing would be a woman” 
(Spurs 57). If the stylus is the phallic object which the male author, such as Nietzsche, uses to make his 
inscription, then the polysemy of meaning, the play of language, would be female, that which can never 
return to the philosopher and be captured as truth. In the reversal staged in the photograph, we see what it 
means for woman to wield the phallus and avoid the dominance, mastery, and control of the 
phallogocentric philosopher. She avoids it through play. The photograph is deliberately out of proportion. 
Nietzsche planned for the wagon to be too small. He also makes a joke of his own self-image, positioning 
himself staring off toward the horizon in elevated thought (Andres-Salomé 111). We see that the phallus 
cannot be taken, the male philosopher cannot be castrated, because the phallus was never properly or 
exclusively male but rather was a phallus-for, a phallus-for-the mother, or the mother’s phallus. As Freud 
describes in his essay entitled “Fetishism,” the fetish—usually involving items that resemble pubic hair 
such as fur, velvet, or lace—is based on the last thing the child sees before he sees that the mother does 
not have male genitals (199). Truth becoming female then is not about locating women within a specific 
economy, either in the patriarchal household or in the progressive workplace, or the male chauvinist fear 
of women castrating men, rather truth becoming female is truth as deferral, delay, as différance. The 
becoming female of truth is truth as delay and mediation through the other. 
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Like the phallus the truth is not something the woman possesses. It is the male phantasy that she 
first has a phallus and is later in need of a phallus. The infant imagines he can respond to this lack by 
being the phallus for the mother. Truth is the fetishized object of the male philosopher, but woman 
understands that truth is an effect, a secondary illusion, and she avoids possession and castration. She 
wields the phallus. The proper name of the philosopher does not belong properly to the father but to 
suppressed feminine. When truth becomes female, the right to inheritance of the proper name of the 
philosopher necessarily involves mediation through the mother. This mediation reveals that the truth is 
not male, selfsame, or present in the first place but rather originally self-estranged. As Derrida describes 
in The Ear of the Other, the autobiographer’s father is always already dead and the proper name always 
already the dead author and that life is always the life of the mother. To support this point, Derrida quotes 
from Nietzsche’s biography Ecce Homo where he says “I am, to express it in the form of a riddle, already 
dead as my father, while as my mother, I am still living and becoming old” (qtd. in Ear 15). The 
divergence between the father, the proper name, and the mother, whose name is subsumed by the paternal 
lineage, between the expressed dead and the unexpressed living, is the legacy of the name. The name is 
the doubled and divided name of the father who is always already dead. As Derrida says, “You will not be 
able to hear and understand my name unless you hear it with an ear attuned to the name of the dead man 
and the living feminine” (Ear 16). The ear is the organ of reception. It is passive and receives. It is a 
passivity that is also an action, it makes speech and the authentic transmission of the logos possible. But 
this passage of speech through otherness is borrowed on credit from the listening audience and at stake is 
the return, the surplus value, the profit from the investment in the form of the genuine inheritance of truth 
under the authority of the proper name of the philosopher. But the passage is not transparent. Neither truth 
nor castration are the essence of woman, but rather the projection of the male philosopher. This play of 
presence and absence, the cut of the sexes, relies not the suppression of an originary absence as Heidegger 
describes, but rather the absence of origins in the address to the other.  
Heidegger is fundamentally concerned about the metaphysics underlying the drive toward 
systematization. In his view, a distinction is necessary between the ontic objects of philosophy and 
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ontology as the study of being. The mistake is that metaphysical philosophy assumes that it has arrived at 
truth when it has achieved the location of its object with an ordered arrangement. As Heidegger describes 
in “What Is Metaphysics?”, it isn’t simply the drive by metaphysical philosophy to mistake being for 
beings and determine knowledge as the organization of beings according to systematic taxonomies. As 
Derrida describes in an interview, this thought of the absence that precedes what is present, is the 
consideration that drives his work. Moving beyond Heidegger however, Derrida puts into question the 
form of the question itself as the true form of philosophy. Rather than revealing a foundational question, 
as in Heidegger’s question “what is being?”, Derrida reveals the foundational relation to the other. In an 
interview he explains, “In order to ask a question I must address someone” (On Being 5:05). This 
relationship to the other is marked by the absence of the other. It is because the other is not present that I 
must address myself to him or her in order to ask a question. Rather than ontic presence preceded by 
being, the ontic-ontological difference is made possible by difference as other. The lack of presence and 
the self-same that provokes the question “what is?”. 
This lack of presences makes our attempts at answering the question of being iterative. Every 
time we form the question, we attempt to apprehend the other according to a particular system of meaning 
that operates under the authority of the question. Metaphysics attempts to locate truth in this particular 
way, but the foundation of this systematization requires repeated crises of the foundational concepts of the 
systems it forms. This foundational crisis reveals not that there is a more foundational ontological being, 
but rather that the ontic-ontological difference is preceded by difference. The primary mode of the 
metaphysical tradition seeks the iteration of truth through a process of repetition. As Socrates tells us, 
paraphrasing the Odyssey, “and if I believe that someone else is capable of discerning a single thing that 
is also by nature capable of encompassing many, I follow ‘straight behind, in his tracks as if he were a 
god’” (Phaedrus 266B). Derrida focuses on this idea of legacy and footsteps as a matter of reiteration in 
the following of truth. Footsteps are tracks or marks that guide the path of the inheritor of truth. Through 
following the correct authoritative footsteps, I arrive at the truth as the many understood and captured by 
the one. Writing possess a status as other, as a secondary vehicle, in Plato’s conception of truth. But 
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footsteps are also a form of writing. Footsteps leave traces. Heidegger’s concern is that Plato, in 
attempting to locate truth, has mistaken beings for being and thereby forgotten the question of being. 
Derrida reminds us that every step, whether that step follow Heidegger or Plato, even prior to an external 
injury “has to bear disequilibrium within itself,” (Freud’s Legacy 406). Every step is always already a 
limp. Rather than the other as an instance of the same, the step embodies différance within itself. The 
question, as the self-binding governing logos presiding over the differential play of presence and absence, 
therefore loses its privileged position as master and arbiter of meaning. We conclude with the abundance, 
multiplicity, and proliferation of the other that can never be subsumed under a given form.  
 It’s not that Derrida would call for the total abandonment of New Criticism, and much less, the 
total abandonment of questioning. His readings always begin by assuming the established modes of the 
given text. However, the phallogocentric ideal that the text can be mastered in the way the New Critics 
originally supposed is an illusion. Derrida does not take this as a reason to totally abandon having a 
formal methodology for reading, he rather states that some form is necessary, but he simply hasn’t arrived 
at the form that will satisfy him, a form that can’t be deconstructed (Form and Meaning 173). 
Deconstruction’s engagement with formalism can be understood in terms of its larger discussion about 
systematic approaches to knowledge and the possible ends and limitations of knowledge, as the process 











4  THE POLITICAL TURN: GREENBLATT, BUTLER, SPIVAK 
 A key focus of the political turn is that form is not simply an internal organic unity in a text but 
rather a uniform self-perpetuating cultural structure of power. Works in the political turn aren’t 
necessarily anti-formalist, rather they seek to understand the text within larger, culturally entrenched 
forms of power. Per-form-ance then is the productive process of inheritance that either unconsciously 
reproduces or consciously subverts the established dominant forms in a given society. In this turn, the 
literary text moves from a self-sustained, freestanding autonomy to a subject of power. It is an expression 
of power relations, and its meaning is dependent upon the relationship of power between the larger 
cultural context, message, and audience. As we will see, these modes, although they employ aspects 
Derridean themes, remain within a metaphysical framework that assumes society represents a unified 
system. Derrida critiques this unified view in both Marx and Foucault as involving foundational 
metaphysical assumptions. 
4.1 Greenblatt 
In many ways, Greenblatt draws on the critical momentum of deconstruction. He is critical of 
Platonic conceptions of truth and is interested in the ways that language structures our relationship to the 
other. But despite these themes, he is decisively rooted in the work of Foucault. His critique of what he 
calls cultural poetics identifies texts as both structured by and structuring systems of power in society. As 
we will see, this focus on power is directly related to Foucault’s concept of discourse. Following Derrida, 
I argue that discourse, in the way Foucault uses the term, suppresses the differential play of différance 
under a unified logos.  
A standard feature of Greenblatt’s approach is to start with a unique statement from a given 
person in a historical period—this often involves people outside of the usual spotlight in a more marginal 
or overlooked place or comments by more mainstream historical figures that have been overlooked by 
other historians—and then use that anecdote as an explanatory model, a form, for understanding the 
broader historical era. In this way, Greenblatt demonstrates the pervasiveness of modes of thought, how 
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even the seemingly tinniest and marginal event can be understood in relation to overarching influences of 
power (Fry Theory 248). Greenblatt begins his book The Power of Forms in the English Renaissance with 
Queen Elizabeth’s statement “I am King Richard II, Know ye not that?”, which reflects her concerns 
about the popular performance of Shakespeare’s play Richard II in the streets to radicalize the audience to 
participate in an uprising against her. Greenblatt’s attack is against both the formalist literary critics who 
look for a stable, universal meaning of a text that remains unchanged by time and place and traditional 
historicists who see the literary text as essentially epiphenomenal, as a product of history but having no 
causal power to influence or shape history. He writes of Elizabeth’s reaction, “clearly it is not the text 
alone…it is rather the story's full situation—the genre it is thought to embody, the circumstances of its 
performance, the imaginings of its audience that governs its shifting meanings” (Power of Forms 2252). 
Greenblatt affirms rhetorical aspects of literature in context over the idea of literature as a disembodied 
abstract universal, arguing that relationships of time and place, speaker, message, and audience inform the 
meaning of the text and that the presentation of the text at various points in time to different audiences 
and with different intentions can change its meaning. Rather than a purely epiphenomenal product of 
history, as literature is seen by the old historians, the text also plays a causal role in shaping how we 
think, feel, and act. As Greenblatt writes, Queen Elizabeth was concerned about the danger when the play 
“had broken out of the boundaries of the playhouse, where such stories are clearly marked as powerful 
illusions, and moved into more volatile zone—the zone she calls "open"—of the streets” (Power of Forms 
2252). Following this idea of moving the text into the open streets, into the broader cultural context that 
exposes competing forces rather than unity, Greenblatt’s approach itself also appears to liberate literary 
texts from fixed forms that control meaning, to move texts into the always open and contingent movement 
of history. He liberates the text from these antiquated Platonic notions of truth floating out there in some 
abstract universal form, unaffected by time and place, and gives the text a new sense of movement and 
agency. The text plays an active role in the discursive system of power-knowledge. It is shaped and 
shapes historically situated discourse. 
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The initial rise of Stephen Greenblatt’s method shows a shift from language to the body, from 
abstract philosophizing to politics. As Paul H. Fry argues, literary studies in this period develops a guilt 
complex, a feeling that culture, global capitalism, Vietnam, and concerns about identity all imply that we 
have passed a certain point and literary studies must turn to address politics (Theory 247). As he further 
elaborates, “it was felt that an ethical tipping point had been arrived at and that the modes of analysis that 
had been flourishing needed to be superseded by those in which history and the political implications of 
what one was doing became prominent and central” (Theory 248). Stephen Greenblatt follows this call 
and argues the formalist approach to literature depends upon "a stable point of reference, beyond 
contingency, to which literary interpretation can securely refer." (Power of Forms 2254). Greenblatt calls 
for a movement from a disembodied idealized notion of truth to culturally embodied, historical truth.  
Despite largely being seen as taking a step beyond the formalism of the New Critics, Greenblatt 
was very interested in issues of form. He uses the term historical contingency, but this contingency is not 
as open ended as the term itself suggests. It seems that rather than leaving form behind, Greenblatt is 
offering us a new definition of form. He argues that the text is formed by and plays a causal role in 
forming cultural discourse: “These collective social constructions on the one hand define the range of 
aesthetic possibilities within a given representational mode and, on the other, link that mode to the 
complex network of institutions, practices, and beliefs that constitute the culture as a whole” (Power of 
Forms 2254). Unlike previous historicisms, Greenblatt doesn’t view the historical moment as a self-same 
unity which the text then reflects, with history as cause and text as effect, rather the text participates in the 
dynamic interweaving of multiple currents in a larger movement of cultural forces. As we will discuss 
later, the tension that arises in this approach to historicism involves how committed the historian of 
contingency can be to critiques of causality and unity while at the same time providing a history. At some 
point is there a demand for unity, if even for the sake of the internal consistency of the author’s own 
account?  How does historical analysis itself both define the limits of the range of aesthetic possibilities 
and establish the boundaries that define the culture as a whole? 
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Greenblatt’s focus on Queen Elizabeth is an excellent choice in support of his argument because 
it shows her own acute awareness of the mutability of the meaning of literary works within the broader 
cultural dynamics of power. When the Earl of Essex, Robert Devereux, made the attempt to raise a 
rebellion in London against Queen Elizabeth in 1601 he was a desperate man. The queen had banned him 
from the court and she did not renew his monopoly on sweet wines, which lead to him falling into 
financial ruin. He didn’t have much support and was dependent on organizing a popular uprising in 
support of his small army to seize London. The play was commissioned by the Earl and his supporters by 
paying forty shillings above the normal ticket price to have the play performed by Lord Chamberlain’s 
Men the night before the uprising. The next day on February 8th, the Earl and around 200 armed men 
marched into London but failed to capture the city and to incite the citizens to rise up in support of their 
cause. 
Greenblatt applies the politicization of performance to scholarly interpretation as well, 
interpretation and presentation are also means of performing a play. His nemesis and representative of the 
old historicism in the text is Dover Wilson, who offers a reading that Richard II is “not at all subversive 
but rather a hymn to Tudor order” (Power of Forms 2252). For Greenblatt, this conclusion reflects the old 
way of doing history that looks at history in terms of broad internally consistent unities: “the earlier 
historicism tends to be monological; that is, it is concerned with discovering a single political vision, 
usually identical to that said to be held by the entire literate class or indeed the entire population” (Power 
of Forms 2253). Once these unities are discovered and understood as internally consistent, they then gain 
“the status of historical fact” (Power of Forms 2254). And once history is understood as facts they’re 
protected and serve as a “stable point of reference, beyond contingency” (Power of Forms 2254). History, 
as a set of facts, is separated from the process of historical interpretation. When history is presented this 
way, historians also tend to view the literary text as merely a reflection of the established facts of a given 
period rather than seeing the work as playing an active role in the production of meaning. Once 
objectified in this way, any later interpretations or presentations of that text are viewed as transparent 
conduits of the facts about the text and its embeddedness in its historical era. The differences in meaning 
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in terms of how, where, or when one presents a text to an audience are overlooked because the meaning is 
inherent to the text itself not to a historical process of interpretation or mode of presentation.  
 However, as Greenblatt points out, Wilson’s interpretation, which favors order over disorder, 
tradition over usurpation, has a political interest. Wilson’s article, "The Political Background of 
Shakespeare's Richard II and Henry IV" was originally presented to the German Shakespeare Society in 
Weimar in 1939, five years after the weakened and struggling Weimar Republic lost it constitutional 
governance, democracy collapsed, Germany became a single-party state under Nazi control, and Hitler 
achieved full dictatorial power. As Greenblatt writes, a new historicist would “look closely at the relation 
between Dover Wilson's reading of Richard II—a reading that discovers Shakespeare's fears of chaos and 
his consequent support for legitimate if weak authority over the claims of ruthless usurper—and the eerie 
occasion of his lecture” (Power of Forms 2254). Greenblatt quotes Wilson making a statement that 
contrasts his own expressed view of history, "these plays should be of particular interest to German 
students at this moment of that everlasting adventure which we call history" (qtd. in Power of Forms 
2254). As Greenblatt demonstrates, including quoting passages from Wilson’s text that contradict 
Wilson’s thesis, although previous movements in historicism and literary studies attempted to deny the 
contingency of interpretation in terms of a timeless, wholistic, and fixed meaning to a text, their own 
words contradict this understanding. The power of the day operates as a kind of cultural unconscious, 
functioning and playing a causal role in our actions of interpretation and suppressing our alternative 
currents of thought whether we actively acknowledge its influence or not.  
For Greenblatt, the approach of starting with an anecdote reinforces his argument that power 
dynamics are so pervasive and hegemonic that even the smallest details are permeated by the over-
arching structures of power. This approach can be seen in both Marx and Foucault. As we see in Marx’s 
discussion of commodity fetishism in Capital, Volume I, the simple, common-place commodity is the 
entryway through which Marx explains the whole world of material human relationships that produce, 
reproduce, and expand capital as a global and totalizing phenomenon (47). Or in Foucault, the singular 
event, the 1757 public killing of Damiens at the beginning of Discipline and Punish for example, is a 
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reflection of a greater cultural shift of the episteme. In this example, the shift from the body politics of the 
monarchical society to the modern microphysics of power. 
 Foucault draws from Marx but takes Marx out of the factory and explores the school, hospital, 
military, and prison as points where the disciplining of bodies is the source and production of power. He 
refers to this disciplining of the body as bio-power and the phenomenon involves not only the subjecting 
of bodies to labor with machines but also the biological, medical, educational, and military understanding 
and ordering of the body, as well as a public interest in sexual reproduction and monitoring birth and 
death rates in the population (History of Sexuality 139). As Foucault explains, “This bio-power was 
without question an indispensable element in the development of capitalism; the latter would not have 
been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the 
adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes” (History of Sexuality 141). This 
understanding of power is no longer simply top down, and neither is the historical material force of 
capitalism the primary cause of inequality, but rather force, in the form of bio-power, is the more primary 
operation that gives rise to capitalism and also makes things appear to us how they are in our normal way 
of seeing and apprehending them. As Greenblatt argues following Foucault, our subjective modes of 
understanding are culturally constituted and historical. Our reaction to the torturing of Damiens is one of 
being offended and even the physical feeling of nausea and disgust, which is different from the reaction in 
1757. What we think, what we are permitted to think, is power. This explains how forms of knowledge 
become dominant in certain places during certain time periods. Power is a ubiquitous mode of circulating 
knowledge. 
Like Foucault, Greenblatt is interested in the contingency of history. In the Order of Things 
Foucault writes, “I am restoring to our silent and apparently immobile soil its rifts, its instability, its 
flaws; and it is the same ground that is once more stirring under our feet” (XXVI). But as Derrida argues 
in “Cogito and the History of Madness,” Foucault’s historicizing has a tendency to construct an 
ontological view of history. Derrida selects Foucault’s Madness and Civilization to make broader claims 
about Foucault’s work. He writes, Foucault’s structuralism presents a “method for which everything 
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within the structural totality is interdependent and circular in such a way that the classical problems of 
causality themselves would appear to stem from a misunderstanding” (Cogito and History 44). As Derrida 
argues, this apparent destabilization of causality however, becomes ordered under Foucault’s 
interpretation, which brings Derrida to ask Foucault about the demand of causality, the necessity of the 
chain of causality, when giving a history: “But I wonder whether, when one is concerned with history, a 
strict structuralism is possible, and, especially, whether, if only for the sake of order and within the order 
of its own descriptions, such a study can avoid all etiological questions, all questions bearing, shall we 
say, on the center of gravity of the structure” (Cogito and History 44). This irresolvable tension between 
the destabilization of causality and providing a historical account leads Derrida to suggest another 
approach. He first quotes from Foucault, “To write the history of madness thus will mean the execution of 
a structural study of an historical ensemble—notions, institutions, juridical and police measures, scientific 
concepts—which hold captive a madness whose wild state can never in itself be restored” (Cogito and 
History 44). Derrida then points out the various fields that Foucault attempts to organize under a unified 
historical ensemble and asks about the meaning of the various terms and how the fields are related, “What 
is a ‘notion’? Do philosophical notions have a privilege? How are they related to scientific concepts?” 
(Cogito and History 44). He then argues for an approach we might understand as formalist. He argues that 
prior to answering these questions subsumed under Foucault’s historical account, we would first require 
“the internal and autonomous analysis of the philosophical content of philosophical discourse” (Cogito 
and History 44). Before situating a philosophical account in history, he argues we must first understand 
what the text of philosophy itself has to say.  
 Derrida’s formalist stance however, is itself a mask, he reads Descartes himself in order to reveal 
what is always already other about Descartes, what the various faces we ascribed to Descartes conceal. 
Derrida turns to the passage on madness from the first Meditation, which plays a primary role for 
Foucault in the movement of western discourse’s suppression of madness in the formation of the modern 
subject. The moment in Descartes is where he is raising foundational epistemological doubts about the 
existence of the external world. First Descartes, mentions that there are people “whose cerebella are so 
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troubled and clogged by the violent vapours of black bile, that they constantly assure us that they are 
kings when they are really poor…” or “believe they are nothing but pumpkins or made of glass…” (qtd. 
in Cogito and History 46). Descartes then states, and this is as Derrida notes the most significant sentence 
in Foucault’s eyes, “But they are mad, and I should not be any less insane were I to follow examples so 
extravagant” (qtd. in Cogito and History 46). This sentence is crucial for Foucault becomes it shows that 
“madness is inadmissible for the doubting subject,” madness is excluded from the enclosure of the 
modern subject (Cogito and History 46). 
Derrida, however, argues that the movement from the consideration of madness to the dream 
hypothesis expresses a more profound epistemic doubt. He argues that the very next paragraph that 
follows immediately after this quoted line, and where the existence of the external world is put into doubt 
by the possibility that he could be dreaming, begins, in the French translation from Latin, with toutefois, 
at the same time (Cogito and History 46). This at the same time for Derrida means that Descartes isn’t 
excluding madness but instead moving toward a thought along the same line that will be of a greater 
impact. When Descartes introduces the notion that he could be dreaming it is toward a more profound 
disturbance of sense certainty and our belief in the reality of the external world. We all very well might be 
mad but it is even more so the case that we all dream and while dreaming at some point have mistaken 
our dream for reality. Derrida writes, “the dreamer insofar as concerns the problem of knowledge which 
interests Descartes here, is further from true perception than the madman (Cogito and History 51). It is in 
this more universal and profound way that we have all accepted illusion for reality that Descartes locates 
his radical skepticism. 
  Foucault’s view that reason escapes madness because it is defined by its exclusion, summarized 
by his rephrasing of the cogito “I who think, I cannot be mad,” cannot be sustained (Cogito and History 
55). As Derrida argues, the cogito escapes madness not from its exclusion but because even if in the 
moment of the statement I am mad the cogito is valid because its validity rests on an appeal to its own 
authority. Even if my thoughts are unreasonable, completely mad, the structuring of thought, and 
existence, in this case in the form of a sentence, is still meaningful. Even if mad, our thought formations 
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are still structured around meaning. This move toward meaning escapes Foucault’s dichotomy of madness 
vs reason (Cogito and History 55). Derrida describes this mode of skepticism by Descartes as hyperbolic 
skepticism (Cogito and History 56). Descartes first presents a natural skepticism, that I could be mad and 
therefore mistaken about my perception of the external world, but then bases his argument on a 
hyperbolic claim. He takes the claim based in common experience, we all dream and have mistaken 
dream for reality, to an excessive, or what Derrida refers to as audacious, claim, we could all be dreaming 
right now and therefore completely mistaken about reality. This excessive claim, that finds meaning in a 
suspension of disbelief and willingness to engage in the extravagant thought, points toward meaning that 
exceeds logic. It is an illogical leap, a metaphor, granted on the charity of the reader that returns to us an 
excessively meaningful statemen, a claim that exceeds logic, that is true even if it is not thought by a 
healthy or logical individual.  
 When turning from Foucault’s historicism to the text of philosophy itself, Derrida takes a 
formalist stance. He argues only after first working out the meaning of the text itself, could we then begin 
“to situate it in its total historical form” (Cogito and History 44). He then proceeds beyond formalism to 
show us what is always already uncanny and other about a text. When we address ourselves to texts, 
whether as formalists, or simply posing the form of a question, we foundationally address ourselves to the 
other of the text, we ask the text to mean something, to answer back. This questioning always has a 
particular structure, a syntax, and the answer, a corresponding syntax that is reciprocal to the syntax of the 
question. Prior to this form of the question, which is the classical and privileged form of philosophy, is 
our address to what is incalculable about the other. The incalculability that is other. This excessive 
element of meaning, in this reading within the text of philosophy itself, precedes and can never be 
subsumed by its own internal demand for form even before it is asked to be located within historical form 
by historicism.  
 Derrida’s style then, his approach, is neither a history nor a genealogy, nor a Heideggerian 
phenomenology, nor a structuralist linguistics, from which it borrows a certain removed sense of distance, 
but a kind of formalism that deconstructs formalism. He inhabits texts, taking them on their own terms, 
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and thereby undermines the very foundational features which the text claims to establish its self-same 
consistency and autonomy. Greenblatt and Foucault’s approaches, although they attempt to uproot truth, 
serve the effect of subsuming and categorizing the differential play of meaning under a unified historical 
narrative. Butler also demonstrates this tendency in Greenblatt to follow Foucault. Butler continues to 
focus on power-knowledge and the role of performance, specifically related to gender and sexuality, and 
Spivak makes a break with Foucault in order to re-affirm Marx. As we will see, both of these approaches 
also involve traditional metaphysical references.  
4.2 Butler 
 Butler sees a permeating form of violence as essential aspect of the social construction of human 
subjectivity. This normative violence is a hegemonic form of power that permeates society and regulates 
our gender and sexual norms. In The Psychic Life of Power, Butler describes her theory of subjection. 
According to her view, the term “signifies the process of becoming a subject” (3). In this framework, we 
become human through the process of conforming to the dominant norms and practices of society. In this 
social constructivist analysis of the human, we are not born, but rather become human through the process 
of socialization. She develops this idea from the notion of interpellation from Althusser and discursive 
productivity from Foucault, where “the subject is initiated through a primary submission to power” 
(Psychic 3). Following Foucault, she uses the term discourse to describe how these norms are guided by 
and shape identities through relationships of power. Rather than discourse being a matter of producing 
meaning through thinking, Foucault understands discourse as “ways of constituting knowledge, together 
with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and 
relations between them” (Weedon 108). For Butler, gender is not something we naturally or essentially 
are. A statement such as “I am a man” is not an expression of a present and stable inner truth of my being. 
Rather, gender is performative in the sense that my speech act of saying “I am a man” combined with the 
disciplined repetition of behaviors that align with restricted idealized norms of gender over time constitute 
my identity. 
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 Butler describes the prohibition of homosexual desire as an originary violence because it is the 
prohibition of homosexual desire that is at the origin or foundation of the subject (Psychic 25). In Butler’s 
view, idealized morphologies of gender and heterosexuality code and shape our behavior. Butler relates 
her conception of subjection as the productive process formed by idealized, restricting norms back to 
Nietzsche and Freud (Psychic 22). She writes, “both account for the fabrication of conscience as the effect 
of an internalized prohibition, (thereby establishing ‘prohibition’ as not only private, but productive)” 
(Psychic 22). Butler is interested in the way that “in Freud and Nietzsche, a prohibition on action or 
expression is said to turn ‘the drive’ back on itself, fabricating an internal sphere, the condition of subject 
formation, a primary longing in recoil that is traced in Hegel’s view of the unhappy consciousness as 
well” (Psychic 22). Through the suppression of particular drives, the subject starts to take shape through 
prohibitive norms. Butler describes this process writing, “conscience is the means by which a subject 
becomes an object for itself, reflecting on itself, establishing itself as reflective and reflexive. The ‘I’ is 
not simply one who thinks about him- or herself; it is defined by this capacity for reflective self-relation 
or reflexivity” (Psychic 22). As particular drives that would initially be expressed outwardly are 
suppressed, they are turned reflexively on the self in a way that begins the process of identity formation. 
Conscience, as internalized ideal modes of behavior, takes the self as an object and starts the process of 
subjection. For Butler, the suppression of the drive for same-sex love is the fundamental prohibition that 
structures the subject. She argues, “the foreclosure of homosexuality appears to be foundational to a 
certain heterosexual version of the subject. The formula ‘I have never loved’ someone of similar gender 
and ‘I have never lost’ any such person predicates the ‘I’ on the ‘never-never’ of that love and loss” 
(Psychic 23). She describes this process of repression as a double negation because there is a denial of the 
drive and then a denial of the feeling of loss that predicates the I. She states, “indeed, the ontological 
accomplishment of heterosexual ‘being’ is traced to this double negation, which forms its constitutive 
melancholia, an emphatic and irreversible loss that forms the tenuous basis of that ‘being’” (Psychic 23). 
In Butler’s view, the very being of the subject as present and accountable to social discourse is a product 
of the heteronormative repression of homosexual desire and the denial of that repression. Rather than 
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being born with either a male or female gender and heterosexual identity, we are socially constituted and 
shaped as subjects within particular identities through the prohibitions that guide the performance of our 
behaviors.  
 Butler makes a powerful claim toward the primacy of the violence of heteronormative 
suppression of gender and sexual identity in early childhood development as the primary mechanism of 
social control. As a contrary point of reference, we might reference a Marxist-feminist account on gender 
identity and social change offered by Simon de Beauvoir. In an interview, entitled “The Second Sex 25 
Years Later,” Beauvoir argues that challenges to the cultural mythology surrounding gender are 
foundationally rooted in the disruptions to traditional cultural arising from the historical material 
movement of capital. She states, “As technology expands – technology being the power of the brain and 
not of the brawn—the male rationale that women are the weaker sex and hence must play a secondary 
role can no longer be logically maintained…It was thus normal that the feminist movement got its biggest 
impetus in the very heartland of imperial capitalism, even if that impetus was strictly one of economics, 
that is, the demand for equal pay for equal work” (Gerassi 1976). Because of changes in technology, labor 
in the mid-twentieth century no longer involved pure muscle but instead brain power, thereby rendering 
obsolete the male chauvinist myth that men are superior to women because women are physically weak. 
Beauvoir argues that this change is why an essential push in the feminist movement first occurred in the 
US, “the very heartland of imperial capitalism,” around the struggle for equal wages. This view of the 
primary causal, historical material force of capital in uprooting traditional culture and its mystical and 
religious views is captured in the much quoted phrase from Marx in the Communist Manifesto, “all that is 
solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned” (16). I offer this counter point, not to side between 
Butler’s view, which draws heavily on Foucault, or Beauvoir’s view drawing heavily from Marx. Both 
are equally compelling arguments that have been incredibly influential in the struggle for gender and 
sexual equality. Rather, I put this argument forward to show how two very distinct accounts with two 
very distinct ontologies can offer compelling and influential arguments.  
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To address this gap between two incommensurable systems offering two distinct foundational 
ontologies, I argue that Derrida offers an crucially valuable approach. With reference to the previously 
discussed essay “Cogito and Madness,” we might also turn to Derrida’s essay “Structure Sign and Play” 
and the before mentioned “Critique of Violence” in order to deconstruct this reference to a foundational 
center. Rather than exclusively queer, Derrida’s work asks us to address ourselves to what is always 
already other about a person. This otherness might very well include categories of gender, race, class, and 
sexuality but they would also include that which is uncategorizable. Categories, such as sexuality and 
material class position, are of extreme importance to individuals, but one or many of those categories may 
also not be the sole ontological defining feature of the other, but rather one form through which we 
attempt to address ourselves to the other in the interest of justice. We might think of the way that workers 
in social services in the US now often refer to individuals as experiencing homelessness rather calling 
individuals homeless people as an attempt to deontologize our address to others, or Zora Neal Hurston’s 
essay “How it Feels to be Colored Me” in which she discusses the various ways she experiences her 
identity both within and beyond categories of race and experiences of oppression and liberation. This 
address to the other would come before our interpretive systems, our attempts to understand the other 
within a system. By deconstructing unified views, Derrida argues that deconstruction is justice because by 
deconstructing our forms of interpreting the other within metaphysics it brings us back to this more 
foundational and unresolvable relationship to the other.  
4.3 Spivak  
 Spivak’s major shift from Derridean deconstruction is that she takes up deconstruction as a tool to 
serve a Marxist mode of critique. She offers a postcolonial, Marxist feminism informed by 
deconstruction. As she describes in “Can the Subaltern Speak”, her task as a postcolonial intellectual is 
not the same as Derrida, who she argues performs a Nietzschean philosophical and psychoanalytic 
critique of western philosophy, rather than a specifically political critique (Subaltern 89). Her criticism is 
directed at Foucault in a dialogue with Deleuze. In particular, she argues that Foucault’s mystifying 
46 
concept of power presents an undivided subject that is Eurocentric. His universal subject is in fact the 
“Subject of Europe” (Subaltern 69). This subject without foundational contradictions becomes especially 
problematic for Spivak when Foucault addresses the third world subject. His Eurocentric and totalizing 
analysis overlooks the international division of labor that constitutes the divided subjectivity of oppressed 
people in the third world (Subaltern 69). She suggests that Marx provides a better account of the 
constitutive contradiction of the subject and therefore a better basis for the analysis of subjects in the third 
world. Spivak also draws on Derrida’s critique of the ethnocentric relationship with the other but argues 
that where Derrida defines ethnocentrism in relation to the other as a “general crises of European 
consciousness,” the other can be better traced in an analysis of “the imperialist constitution of the colonial 
subject” (Subaltern 89). This post-colonial Marxist account examines the way Foucault in particular, and 
the European intellectual in general, constructs the third world person as other from a self-centered and 
closed mode of thinking. At the heart of her discussion then is the question of representation and our 
relationship to the other. How is it that the third world person can speak and be represented?  How can 
this person have a political voice, an active influence in changing policy and economic relationships when 
they are denied material modes of organizing and exercising political and economic influence? This lack 
of political voice in the form of material agencies means that no one can address their grievances because 
their actions are constantly misrepresented and therefore misinterpreted. 
 The first half of Spivak’s essay focuses on articulating two forms of representation that Marx 
describes in relationship to French peasant-farmers in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. Her 
goal is to articulate the problem of representation of the divided subaltern subject drawing from a Marxist 
critique (Subaltern 69). In this work by Marx, she sees the fundamental paradox of representation for 
those that don’t fit into typical models of class struggle. Drawing from Gramsci she uses the term 
subaltern, which describes the position of marginalized and displaced subjects, to define oppressed 
people in the third world. The Eighteenth Brumaire opens with Marx’s famous statement about history 
repeating itself: “all great world-historic facts and personages appear twice…the first time as tragedy, the 
second time as farce” (5). The text focuses on the distinction between parody and genuine revolution,  
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“between the spirit (Geist) of the revolution and its specter (Gespenst)” (Specters 143). The spirit being 
the mode through which genuine revolutionary inheritance can take place, and the specter being that 
which haunts revolution, causes it to seek a disguise in the costume, personages, and poetics of previous 
revolutions. For Marx, peasants, as opposed to the proletariat, are in particular danger of parodied 
revolution because they have no common interest that forces them to share a collective identity and 
therefore do not represent a class in the historical material sense (Eighteenth Brumaire 62). Without this 
class interest, they are forced to look toward a political representative to stand in and speak for them. In 
the case of French peasants, a superficial representative Napoleon III, the cousin of the Napoleon who 
was a gambler who spent years in exile, gained the peasants support and was elected the president of 
France. This question of representation for the peasant-farmer, a supplemental non-class, as opposed to 
the proletariat, who finds economic representation through class struggle, creates the space for Spivak to 
ask about the possibility of the subaltern finding its own voice, of speaking for itself. In the second half of 
her essay, she turns to an analysis of a revolutionary activist in India whose suicide was misinterpreted. 
 For Spivak, the idea of speaking for oneself is found in the distinction between two German terms 
translated as representation in English:  Darstellung, representation as tropes embodied in the figure of 
the poet, rhetorician, or actor providing a merely symbolic voice of the people,  and Vertretung, 
representation in the form of a political representative acting as a substitution or in the place of the people 
he represents, e.g. a member of Parliament. This meaning, the distinction between the two, is covered 
over when both are translated as representation in English. This translation to the same word runs the two 
senses together, which resolves the exact tension which Marx wants to point out. As Spivak writes, “the 
complicity of Vertretung and Darstellung, their identity-in-difference as the place of practice since this 
complicity is precisely what Marxists must expose, as Marx does in The Eighteenth Brumaire - can only 
be appreciated if they are not conflated by a sleight of word” (Subaltern 72).  
 As Spivak explains her interest in the EB is because it explains the inner dynamics of false 
representation. She writes, “representation in the economic context is Darstellung, the philosophical 
concept of representation as staging or, indeed, signification, which relates to the divided subject in an 
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indirect way” (Subaltern 73). As a key example of Darstellung, she quotes a passage from the section on 
commodity fetishism in Capital, Vol. I, where Marx explains that the exchange-value, rather than the use-
value becomes “the common element which represents itself [sich darstellt] in the exchange relation” and 
“is thus its value” (qtd. in Subaltern 73). The price tag on the commodity we encounter in the store 
becomes the value of the commodity, which functions as a sort of objective ontological valuation of the 
item, and we don’t think of the world of material relations of production and human activity that produced 
that value. The whole material context, which she refers to using the Derridean phrase the scene of 
writing, then is the stage where false identification, acting as performance, becomes the means through 
which we encounter and valuate the object.  Darstellung then is made possible and maintained by 
Vertretung, the political force of representative democracy. As Marx writes in “On The Jewish Question,” 
the division between the political state and the civil society, between the collective representation of 
citizens and the private individual, creates and protects the private property form necessary for capitalism 
(34).  
 The historical material scene of the rise of Napoleon III is haunted by the hope of Napoleon’s 
transformations that ended in tragedy for the peasants and are then farcically conjured by Napoleon III. 
As Marx describes, “The Napoleonic property form, which at the beginning of the nineteenth century was 
the condition of the emancipation and enrichment of the French countryfolk, has developed in the course 
of the century into the law of their enslavement and their pauperism” (Eighteenth Brumaire 63). The 
small land holdings were mortgaged by banks and peasants went into debt and many lived in extreme 
poverty. The peasants were also given a sense of pride through military service combined with 
nationalism. As Marx writes, “The uniform was their own state costume; war was their poetry; the small 
holding, enlarged and rounded off in imagination, was their fatherland, and patriotism the ideal form of 
the sense of property” (Eighteenth Brumaire 65). But later the peasant found himself sunk into mortgage 
debt. As Marx writes, “the enemies whom the French peasant now has to defend his property against are 
not the Cossacks; they are the huissiers [bailiffs] and the tax collectors. The small holding no longer lies 
in the so-called fatherland but in the registry of mortgages” (Eighteenth Brumaire 65). And the army no 
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longer represents their honor, “the army itself is no longer the flower of the peasant youth; it is the swamp 
flower of the peasant lumpen proletariat” (Eighteenth Brumaire 65). And as Marx continues, “it consists 
largely of replacements, of substitutes” (Eighteenth Brumaire 65). Wealthier people in France were able 
to pay others to serve in their place in the conscription military service.  
 Although Napoleon’s transformations to peasant life ended tragically for the peasant, his persona 
and political actions established tropes which the peasant identified with and through which felt a 
symbolic sense of representation. Although the institutions of private property and the military brought 
the peasant to tragic ruin, they provided a social symbolic or metaphorical framework in which the 
peasant felt he was represented even though he didn’t actually increase his political and economic 
influence. Certain modes of representation allow the peasant to feel he has spoken although his interests 
have not been given causal, material force. Peasants lack the class consciousness needed to have genuine 
revolutionary representation. Napoleon III finds a currency in the name Napoleon. The fetishized 
exchange value of the name stands in for political representation. It parodies political representation for 
its own private gain. He is a parody of that name, and the peasants look to his performance not to find 
resolution in truth but in fantasy. This is where psychoanalysis talks about the dream as wish fulfillment. 
Political theater provides the fantasy space for a staged repetition in order to symbolically resolve 
previously unresolved events and failed expectations from the past. The staged show supplements real life 
and becomes a mode of catharsis by giving us a place we can project our emotions and through that 
process heal unresolved mental wounds. Marx describes the peasants as conservative rather than 
progressive (Eighteenth Brumaire 63). Peasants accept this showmanship, they cling to the dreams of the 
past, and accept the catharsis of imagined representation in place of a political force of their own. 
 Spivak draws on this analysis and turns to a discussion of an Indian activist, Bhuvaneswari 
Bhaduri, whose suicide was misinterpreted by her family and others. As Spivak writes, “the suicide was a 
puzzle since, as Bhuvaneswari was menstruating at the time, it was clearly not the case of an illicit 
pregnancy” (Subaltern 103). It was only later discovered that she was part of an armed resistance 
movement for Indian independence, and she had been asked to carry out an assassination. As Spivak 
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writes, “unable to confront the task and yet aware of the practical need for trust, she killed herself” 
(Subaltern 103). Spivak argues that the suicide was misunderstood. Her act of delay, “waiting for 
menstruation,” was intended as an act of displacement of the likely male-centered interpretation that her 
suicide was the result of her passion for a man, that a woman’s life essentially belongs to a man. 
However, other family members speculated that her suicide was a result of her brothers taunting her for 
being too old not be a wife (Subaltern 103). As Spivak describes, the suicide also occurs in the social text 
of Sati, the ritualistic practice of widow suicide. Women who traditionally practiced this suicide would 
have been expected to wait for menstruation to pass before the act because they would have been 
considered unclean. The accepted interpretations of her suicide reconstructed the male centered cultural 
narratives surrounding female suicide. They interpreted her suicide, because she was menstruating, as an 
ad-hoc or misperformed iteration of Sati. This interpretation then effectively rendered her silent by 
presenting her act within dominant male-centered narratives.  
 Spivak concludes, drawing from this event, that the subaltern cannot speak (Subaltern 104). 
Because subaltern individuals don’t have access to structures of political representation their actions are 
subject to misinterpretation. As Spivak states in an interview, Bhuvaneswari “had spoken with her body, 
but could not be heard. To say the subaltern cannot speak is like saying there’s no justice (Paulson 2016). 
Spivak shows that the mutually permeating structures of Darstellung and Vertretung set the scene for 
Bhuvaneswari’s actions not to be heard, for her voice to be rendered silent. This silence means that she 
cannot be granted justice. In our relationship to her as other, we lack the material means that would allow 
her to speak and therefore we cannot hear her. 
 In Derrida’s critique of Marx in Specters of Marx, he argues the possibility of misrepresentation 
is the very essence of representation. As Derrida writes, the two forms of representation, genuine and 
parody, Spirit and ghost, “contaminate each other sometimes in such a troubling manner, since the 
simulacrum consists precisely in miming the phantom” (Specters 139). In Derrida’s view the binaries in 
Marx between material and immaterial, base and superstructure, use value and exchange value, all are 
haunted by their constitutive other (Specters 204). It is here where Marx is not radical enough, his need to 
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exorcise the ghost and arrive at a material interpretation set him up for a haunting, cause his work to be 
metaphysical. Rather than the material foundations of capitalism creating the division between 
Darstellung and Vertretung, Derrida argues the two forms of representation haunt each other. They are 
each the other through which we define each individual term in the binary.  
 If we draw on Derrida’s critique of Marx as well as Derrida’s expressed interest in justice. We 
perhaps see the emergence of another theme arising from Spivak’s essay. Both within and beyond 
Bhuvaneswari’s silence, Spivak approaches her story with an interest in justice. It is in consideration of 
her misinterpretation by what Spivak refers to as the social text as well as the historical material 
conditions of her subaltern position that Spivak approaches her as other, as the other that has not been 
justly accounted for. The possibility of injustice, of violent misinterpretation, creates a demand of the call 
of the other. This inequality is also at the heart of what we consider correct interpretation. As Derrida 
writes of Levinas, “Here equity is not equality, calculated proportion, equitable distribution or distributive 
justice but rather absolute dissymmetry” (Force of Law 959). Rather than a specifically Marxist 
metaphysics we turn to Derrida’s interest in Levinas, which Derrida says is not completely unlike a 
Jewish mystical notion of “sanctity” (Force of Law 959). Rather than a materialism, this mystical turn in 
Derrida, distinguishes between the law and the “heteronomic relation to others, to the faces of otherness, 
that govern me, whose infinity I cannot thematize and whose hostage I remain” (Force of Law 959). Our 
commitment to the other is both preceded by and exceeds what Marx would refer to under the unified 
term historical material. The material, then, rather than a base, is one way through which the social text 
approaches the relationship to the other. And history would exceed the division between fact and fiction, 
scientific understanding and mythology. The social text through which Spivak writes and interprets and 
takes up Bhuvaneswari’s story is not purely historical, it also draws on fiction. As Spivak says in an 
interview, “that’s what you do if you can’t carry through an assassination. Then you kill yourself. I mean, 
I don’t understand those things but we’ve read enough Dostoevsky and we’ve read enough about the 
struggle against imperialism in India to know that this kind of thing happened” (Paulson 2016). This 
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understanding then is an attempt to interpret and give a just account of the other. It is always already 
oriented toward the other because to tell a story, I must foundationally address myself to others. 
4.4 Metaphysics of the Political Turn 
 In Derrida’s lectures on Being and Time entitled Heidegger: The Question of Being and History, 
Derrida discusses Heidegger’s critique of the Hegelian metaphysics of the model of the oppressed 
struggling for recognition. Derrida states, when Heidegger speaks of war, “[he] does not tell stories, he 
speaks neither of the struggle between individuals or consciousnesses, like Hegel…, nor of groups, states 
or classes. But…by thinking them at the level of the originary and in the horizon of the question of being” 
(198-199). In Heidegger’s critique of Hegelian metaphysics, he argues that there is a more primary 
ontological basis that the “phenomena described, for example, by Hegel by the name of ‘struggle for 
recognition’ can possibly come about” (197). Heidegger argues that violence, warfare, polemos, is “the 
phenomenon of the meaning of being” (199). 
 In Derrida’s description of the aporetic structure of justice, he argues that the rule of law is 
foundationally unstable in its being because it is always already other. The being of the law, in its 
constitution, is always haunted by the ghost of the undecidable. The undecidable can never be fully 
accounted for by the narrative of the dialectical struggle for recognition between dominant and non-
dominant groups within the sphere of law. In Derrida’s view, the undecidable can never be neatly folded 
into the system, it always haunts the system, remaining irreducible, threatening the destruction of that 
system from the inside. As Derrida writes, “the undecidable remains caught…. Its ghostliness 
deconstructs from within any assurance of presence, any certitude or any supposed criteriology that would 
assure us of the justice of a decision, in truth of the very event of a decision” (Force of Law 965). 
Deconstruction, that deconstruction is even possible, reveals that the system is always already not self-
same and present. The undecidable is both the condition of possibility and the impossibility of the system 
of law. This failure of the law to establish a self-same presence reveals the more primary violence at the 
origin of being. Because being lacks presence, it can never be captured in terms of a formalism or a 
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structuralist account of human society founded on a central prohibition. Formalism is a mode through 
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